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PHEPAGi^
This paper is intended to describe and analyze the
methods, rationale and influence of the Palestinian Arab
refugees in their attempts to prevent an Arab-Israeli set—
tlamant of the Middle dast conflict*

Palestinian tactics

have been both direct and indirect. ;3inc@ 1947» the Pales/

tinians have had an effect on the policies and actions of the
United Nations and the five Middle iiiastem governments most
directly involved. The Palestinians* power and influence
have grown considerably during the 1960*8 and show little
prospect of waning.
The Palestinian conflict, originally oonflaed to diplomatic
maneuvering betwewi representatives of the Arab states and
Israel in the United Nations, has gradually broadened to inp>
elude the Palestinians as an important third elm^nt. Mich of
the Palestinians* present role in the Middle Eastern wnflict, as
will be shown, can be directly attributed to actions, or inaction,
on the part of the regional governments, both in their treat
ment of the refuses and in their failure to reach a settlement.
Thou^ the Palestinians are Arabs, their methods and goals differ
f±om those of the Arab Govemn^nts.

Bven with the status being

accorded them today, the Palestinians sema to be only compli
cating and prolonging an already complex problem.

In att^pting to desoriba how the Paleatlaiaas have had
a negative izifluenoe in reaching a solution of the Middle aaste^i
oonfliot, it has been necessary to rely, perhapa a little too
heavily, on «mrrent newspaper and news magazine artioles.

/here

possible. United Nations documents have been used. Hovvever,
much of the material dealing with current events and refugee
organization is not available tvom U* H* sources*

For, unless

the military confrontations or governmmital crises directly
affect U. B. operations in the area, these occurrences are not
reported in official U* B. documents. Hor has the United Bâtions
had reason to be concerned with the Palestinians* effects on
either internal or regional politics of the States involved
unless these politics have led to a major military clash such
as in 1967.
There has also been a dwrth of scholarly articles cxa the
refugees. Sevwal reasons can be given for this, :'irst, the
ref\igees tend to be quite secretive about their organizations and
operations. The refugee population has also been quite mobile and,
until recently, rather inarticulate. It has been necessary to
rely on observations by United Nations personnel and journalists
who have visited the area, and on statements of the refugee
leaders as they are published in the news s^ia^ in an attempt
to determine refugee attitudes and objectives. However, a
variety of sources have been studied and, in general, accounts
of particular events or of the refugees* feelings and goals do
not differ signifioantly.
This paper is not intended to speculate on a solution to
iii

the oonfllot. Rather it is designed to show the oomplexities
of the pr^&nt situation and the present influence of the
Palestinians, This influence is felt in the refugees' rela
tionships with Israel and witii the Arabs, both domestioally
and regionally, and has been pronounced enough to deter these
govwmmants frcm achieving a solution*

Only cursory mmititm is

made of Arab and Israeli govermwatal positions relative to
a solution, althou^ their attitude toward liie reAigees is
explained, fio mention is mide of outside governmental stands,
and particularly those of the Soviet Unicm and the United States.
Therefore, the scope of the paper is not such as to allow for
cmtlining a final or complete solution.

iv

OBAPTÏÏR I
IHTHODUCTIOH
The Palestine problmn, around

today's Mddle Zast

oonn.iot is oentered, has roots far older than the United
J^ations interventimi in 1947*

Religious oonfllot, one faoet

of the present problmi, oan be traced badk to Biblical times
and the o<mfliots betweœn the Moslems and the Jews, However,
despite religious differences, the present problem oan largely
be attributed to various polioies of ths British Ckxvemment
during tbe early Twentieth Ceniairy, and to the United Hâtions
partitioning of Palestine in 1947#
Prior to Israel's beocHsing a sovereign state in 1948# the
territory of Palestine^ had bemi undw British rule. In 1917»
Lord Balfour of the British Govammmit issued a statement
granting the Jem the right to a Jewish National Home in
Palestine. The Jewish population interpreted this statanent,
known as the Balfour Deolarati<m, to mean that Great Britain
acknowledged the Jews* right to a separate state. The Arab
population felt #e Declaration granted the Jews a ri^t to
%ee maps. Appendices A, B, and C. Before 1923, Palestine
was the geographical area which is now the states of Jordan and
Israel^ includiz^ all of the areas now occupied by Israel except
for the Sinai Peninsula. In 1946, Jordan, or Transjoardan, was
granted full sovweigpty. At tibie time of the 1947 U. N. Partition
Resolution, Palestine was only the area whidi is presently the
State of Israel, including the occupied areas except Sinai#

live in the area, but to live tuxdar Arab rule.
With Idle formation of tM United Nations, Palestine wut
plaoed under the auspices of Great Britain. Problems had bema
developing among the Arab and Jewish populations of Palestine
for many years, largely as a result of inoreased Jewish
imilgration to the area and the Jewish desire to set up a
Jewish state. The British Govmrzment had tried to limit Jewish
immigration to the area, hoping to end the Moslem-Jewish ccmflicts. However, its action came too late, and only inoreased
the Jewish populaticms determination to obtain its National
Some.
Consequently the British Government finally requested the
aid of the United Nations in resolving the problems in the
area. The "Question of Palestine" was placed on the General
Assembly agenda at the Seoond Session of the United Nations.
The iixab Bi^er C«DEdttee, representing the Arab population
of Palestine, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, representing
the Jewish population, were invited to send observers to supply
su(^ information and to rend^ any assistance as mi^t be
required. Both groups accepted the invitation.
Two plans evolved from the Assembly* s work. The minority
plan called for a unitary Arab-Jewish State set up on a system
of cantons, much as the government of Switzerland is today. The
majority plan called for the creation of two States—one Arab
and one Jewish—Awm the territory of Palestine, with a provision
for eoonomio union between the two states.

-3Tb& majority plan became General Assembly Resolution l8l(ll).
However, no Arab government £kvt>red this plan.
At the time of partition, the Jems ware a minority in
o
Palestine. The Az^bs, having voiced their desire for a unitazy
state, refused %ù aooept "tiie General Assembly* s deoision; ^e
Jews were detarmined to defend #At had been ^ven thma by the
International Goamunity, Thus, in 194B, war broke out between
the nevly ore&ted Jewish State and its Arab neighbors. As a
result of both Arab and Jewish urging, the Arab inhabitants
of Palestine fled to the surrounding Arab states. Those #10
fled felt assured of a speedy return -to their homes as so<m as
the Arab a3W.es defeated Isi^el. Eowev@P, Israel %»s not
defeated, aM on May 11, 1949, was admitted to Aill manAmrship
in the United Nations. Beoause Israel was not defeated, the
problems iAi<A resulted from the creation of the Jewish State
have persisted to the present.
From the time of the admission of Israel to the United
Bâtions, the General Assmibly and its various ommlttees have
been a deWting foxum for both the Arab and Israeli re^peswtam.
tlves. Much of this debate has concerned the Implementation of
the 1940 General Assaably Resolution 194(111), and particularly
of paragpa]^ 11»^ This Resolution outlined a solution to the
2
At the m&d of I946, there ware approximately 608,000 Jews
in Palestine, making up 32.^^ of the pofulatltm. (See United
Nations, Gmieral Assembly, Offlolal Eetx^d# (hereinafter referred
to as QAOR). United Rations Speoial Committee <m Palestine, Volume
I, Supplement Ko. 11, September 3, 1947, P# 11*
%ee Appendix i).

-4situation whidh followd the 1948 <«ar.

Pasragraph 11 outlined

a solution to the reA^gee situation.
While the Arab and Israeli delegates have been debating,
many foromr Arab Palestinians have been existing in refugee camps,
mainly in the Arab nations surrounding Israel.^ «phey have been
oared for primarily by the United Hâtions. Their maintenance
was temporarily the respozmibility of the United Hâtions Eelief
for Palestine EeAigees (UREPR), This body became Ijie mare
permanent United Katioim Relief and x^txcka Agen<^ for Palestine
EeAigees in the Hear aast (UBHWA) i^en it became evident that
there wcmld be no gtiick solution to the Palestine problan or
to the refugee pPobl«n.
Through the years, USEWÂ has, despite often adverse oonditiozm,
provided quite admirably for the basic health, shelter and
subsistence needs of the refugees*

Ho^vever, in the line of

projects to furtWr the developi^nt of the Middle Eastern host
countries and to bring about the social and economic integration
of ^e refugees into the area, the Agency has all but failed.
At the Pour^ Sessiwi of the U. H. in 1949» the General
Assembly made provision for the United Hâtions Conciliation
Commission for Palestine.^ This body urns to act as a mediator
between the Ax&h States and Israel in resolving differences
and facilitating the repatriation or compensation of the refugees.
%ee Appemdiz 0.
^General Assembly Eesolution 3(%(I7).

-5Failure ham been tdie fortune of the Conciliation CcHBodssion*
The C(xml8#l<m has faoed an almost hopeless task. The Isamieli
officials feel that the Cosaoission is prejudioed toward ih@
Arab States, and the Arab officials feel that the G(«mission
is not only worthless^ but also on the aide of Israel*
Following almost twwaty years of Arab—Israeli deadlock,
the goveMmmits of both sides did finally agree to the solution
outlined in the 196? Security Council Besolution,^ Howev®?, the
Eesolutdon was so vagiely phrased and open to interpretation
that each side ctmld read in what it desired. Thou^ there ims
mgreesmit to the printed word, the opposing interia^etations
have thus far kept any implementation of the Resolution frœn
being realised»
For the first ten y^sscn of their exile, the refugees were
heavily dependent on the Arab Govarmmnts to do their negotia-»
ting and to voice their opinions. For the most part, the
Palestinians remained passive, although! embittered against
Israel, and waited to a<^eve the implementation of fieeolution 194(111
During the 1960*8, initially with the encouragement of
several Arab host states, the refugees have be<x)me more organised
and have gained both political and military récognition in the
Middle East. The reftigee organisations also have their own
political goals. These centm" around the liberation of Palestine.
As mill be ahoisn, much of today* s tension in the area is a result
of refiigee att^pts to implement their goal of refining Palestine.
^See Appmidiz E.

GHâPTSH II
îm ARABS AM) TEii IbEàÊLIS
Althoui# tWay the Palestinian Arabs are the main group
blocking a settlement of the Middle Baat conflict, their
influence has not always been so gzxmounoed. From 1947 until
ap^arozimately 1^0, the conflict mjs centered more around
diBagreements between the iirab and Israeli governments* Until
the i960* s, except for the conflicts in 194Ô and 19561 lailitaa^
activities were gmierally subordinated to diplomatic dis—
agreeamnts*

Yet, diplomatic disagremient was not simply twow

Bid# between the Israeli officials and the Arab officials#
The Arab Govwnmmts themBelvee ware unable to agree on a solu
tion*

This governmental dlsagreenent* and consequent prolongation

of the Palestiitô problem, was mxa major factor in bringing about
the rise in InjO-umice of the Palestinians themselves* Had the
govenmmits involved been able to reach a diplomatic agreement
in the earlier stages of the conflict, they very likely could
have imposed it on lAe refugees and brought about peace, rather
than having created the present military situation*
Yet, despite the fact that the îliddle iâast wnflict is no
longer solely between the Governments of the Arab States and
Israel, it semas newssary to look at the political positions of
the Governments involved both to show how these Governments, more

by in&otlon than aotioa, enoouraged, the greamit situation, and
to show the oonfliots between #Le refugees' a^aas and goals and
those of the Middle Eastern governments.
The oreati<m of the State of Israel oaused t±te exodus of
nearly one millitm Arabs ftcm ^e area mhidii had foM^ly bee»
Palestine, The presenoe of these refugees in the Arab States
beoame a faotor of major eoonœnio and sooiaCL disruption, Bearly
one-half of the refugees still live in overpo^lated mreas
#iere vcxrk opportunities are virtually nonexistent. These
refugees have little hope of ever becoming self-supporting, at
least under the presmit eooncmio struoture in the Middle d&st.^
Sinoe 1949, the Arab Governments have generally claimed
that the reAigee problem is the most pressing laroblem in the
Palestine oonfliot and that it must be resolved before disoussiozm
can begin on other outstanding issues such as the pezsaanmit
delimitation of boundaries,

Wi# the exception of Jordan, tJto

Arab governments maintain that Israeli officials must accept the
ri^t of the refugees to retona home. However, the Arab
Governments hars yet to grant Israel political recognition as
a sovweign state, despite the State's twenigr—two year md.8tmi(*.
Thus, Israeli officials have been unwilling to discuss solutions
to the refugee w Palestine problems,
Heither Arab nor Israeli officials want to make the concessions
^GAOH, 6th Session, Assistance to Palestine Refugees,
Interim Eepwt of the Director of the United Hâtions Belief and
forks Ageiicy for Palestine Refugees in tSm Bear East (A/145I/
Eav. 1), Supplenent Humber 19, 195I, p. 13,

neœesary to break the political deadlock*

Both sides have oome

to agree that the situation as is cannot centime indefinitely,
but neither want» to surrender its possible political advantages
and begin a oomiapomiae.
Until 1967» the Arab and Israeli governments based their
positions largely on interpretations of the 1948 Genwal Assembly
Resolution 194(111) which outlined a solution to the refugee
question. One facet of this Resolution proposed allowing the
refugees a choice betwemi repatriation to their old homes now
in Israel or resettlement in the Arab countries or elsewhere.
Israeli Position
Israeli authorities have refused to acknowledge en masse
repatriation of the refugees as a possible solution. The goveromment claims that repa^iation is qualified by practicality and
regional peace*

Because of the influx of Jewish imxigpcante,

nmny Axxn the Arab countries, repalsriatioaa is impractical. Peace,
obviously, does not exist. Israeli officials seriously douot
that, if repatriated, the refugees would be loyal oitizms. They
strongly question whether any state could be required to do that

2
whidx is inconsistent with its own survival.
The Israeli delegates to the United Hâtions point out that
if the Arab Governments ^%ly wanted the State of Israel to
repatriate the refugees or pay compensation to those not choosing

2„ ,^0

c,—4—

A J II—

^ tioal Oommittee, 3$th

-9to return, they would end their eoonoEdo boycotts against Israel
and would agree to enter into direct negotiations, an Israeli
government prerequisite for any soluticm.^
The Israeli delegates have pointed out that in 1949 their
government did agree to tfUce bac^ 100,(KX3 refugees#
#as not even acknowledged by the Arab GkysnarzuzwMilxB*'^

The off«p
Again in

1957, the Israeli Government offered to attempt a large-scale
repatriation endeavor, {X>nditi<aial on Israel's administration
of the Gaaa Strip. This offer, too, #a8 ignored»^ How, except
for reunifi(*ition of families and a few special cases, Israel*s
^svermmt rejects any large scale repatriation of the refugees.
Israeli delegates provide several reasons for the rejec
tion of repatriation as a solution* The State of Israel has
accepted and integrated himdreds of thousands of Jews frtm around
6
the world and ttmi the neighboring Arab States.

Acceptance of

these Jews, oomblned with the belief that 60^ of the refugees
in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon have been resettled by

spontaneous

absorpticaa" leads officials to believe that the refugee problem
is not so great as the Arab Govwnments claim.^
over

Also by 1956,

of the refugee population was undw 15 years of age.

^GAOB. 18#L Session, Special Political Committee, 410th
Meeting (November 15, 19o3)» p. 18?#
8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Oammlttee, 29th
Meeting (Bovemb«p 11, 1953)» P. 142.
^A. G. IWzerik, ed., Arab Refugees in the Middle East
(Hew York* International Eevl'ew Seivioe, 19^8), p. 3.
^GAOii. 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Gmmittee, 29th
Meeting (Novembw 11, 1953), p. 142*
^GAOB. 14th Session, Special Political Committee, l62nd
Meeting IKovember 30, 1959), P. 164.

"•10»
Most of these younger refugees have no oonsoious memory of
Palestine and wK?e not even Palestinian oitizens.^
The Israeli Gfovemment prefers a solution based on reset
tlement and compensation of the refugees. This solution semis
to be more natural in view of the similarities of language,
cailture and religion between the refugees and the Arab hosts,
Israeli officials feel.^ This alternative has also been
a stalewited issue.
The Israeli Governmmt, in 1950, agreed to the j^inoiple
of oonipensation for lands and buildings abandoned by the
Palestinians. Most of these lands and buildings were occupied
and used by the ino<mlng Jews. Sinoe -tiie I956 V/ar, the Governmaat has linked consideration of the oœnpensation issue to the
abandoommit by the Governments of the Arab States of their
10

eooncmlG boycott against Israel.

Thou^ the Arab Govewunents*

claims #at Israel's treasury is accruing large sums from this
abandoned propez^, the Israeli Government counters that it
has had to invest large anKnmts to reclaim much of the property.
The former Palestinians also abandoned large sums in bank
holdings. The Israeli Government, throu^ the auspices of the
Conciliation Ctxomission, did finally release the majority of

8
GAQ£. 13th Session, Special Political Coosaittee, 106th
Meeting (Novwiber 17, 1958), p. 84#
^GAOR. 15th Session, Special Political Committee, 106th
Meeting (Sovember 17, 1958), p. 83.
^^Meaerik, op. cit.. p. 8, and GAQB. 8th Session, .id Hoc
Political Committee, 29th Meeting (November 11, 1953)» P» 144#
^^GAOB. 15th Session, Special Politioal Committee, 250th
Meeting (April 14, 1961)» p. Ill,

-11these holdings*, including nKmies deposited in accounts and the
contents of safety deposit bo2:es*

However, it considered the

release «us a concession and expected some corresponding action
frim the Arab Governments, %ho considered this release as an
12
obligation and duty on the part of the Israeli Government.
ThoUi^ ^ese accounts were returned directly to their ownws,
Israeli officials maintain t|%at their release does not set a
precedent on the compensation issue*

Bather, any cwQpensation

must be paid to a reintegration fund so that all of the rej^gees
will benefit rather than just those Wio ornnoà property in
Palestine. Most of the former property owers, Israeli officials
feel, do not truly need the monies anymay»^^ Israeli officials
also insist that the value of the property appropriated by the
Arab States frcm their foxmer Jewish residmits should be determined
before arriving at axty final figures on lAich wmpemsation is
to be paid. The value of the Jewish property would

be

deducted from the value of the Arab property abandoned in Israel.^^
The Israeli Government also has specific ideas of methods
of achieving a settlamnt. The Government maintains that no
substitute exists for a peaceAil settleiwnt of disputes by direct
negotiations. Until Arab and Israeli representatives can nego19
Don Perets, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (i/ashington
D. C.I The Middle East Institute, 1950), p. 237.
15th Sessitm. Ad Hoc Political Committee, 35th
Meeting (November 7, 1950), p. 214*
6th Session, Progress Eeport of the United Nations
Conciliation 0(«mission for Palestine (A/1985), Supplanent
Number I8, p. 1.

-12.
tiate direotly on an ov&rall peace eettlmmmt, possibly W.th the
refugee situatia» as the first item to be considered, there wiU
never be much hope for Middle Eastern peace
tiatiens are hampered by the Arab Governments* refusals to grant
political reco^aition to Israel, This idea of negotiations
between governments has nevar been imdi^ed by the Israeli
officials to include -&e Palestine Arabs*
Syriaa Position
Syrian delegates to the General AsseoAly have consistently
maintained that repatriaticm ie the only solution to the refugee
problem. In reply to Israeli delegates* contentions that the
clock cannot be i%it back five, ten or twenty years in order to
allow a return of the ref^igees, Syrian delegates have ramponded
that Israel owes its existence to the clock* s being put back
2,(X30 years*The delegates maintain tm^t the decisitm to
return or to accept cmapensation cannot be arbitraily decided
by the Conclliati<m Coxmissicm, the United Nations or any one
gcvwmaent involved* The refugees must, ii]^vidually, be
givwi ocwapletely free choice betweesn re^mtriation or resettlement
with otmpensation. Fear each refugee is entitled to a choice
under General Assembly Resolution 194(111)*^?
As a general observation, Syrian representatives have
^^GAOR, l8th Session, Special Political Committee, 410th
Meeting (November 15» 1963), p. 181*
l6
GAOS. 7th Sessimi, Ad Hoc Political Oomnlttee, 30th
Meeting (December 2, 1952), p, 175»
17«/,,^» cii. L.—a— »j «— "-•'.itical Committee, 63rd

-13mintained that the entire Palestine problem is the respcmsi—
bility of the United Kations. Since the U, H, perpetrated the
problem by partitioning Palestine, it oannot withdraw its
program of assistanoe, althou#i its relief program is only a
s t o p g a p , I f the United Rations can persuade Israeli officials
to pexiait the refugees to return home, the problem oan at least
be reduced to negligible j^oportions, and probably would oease
to exist. In the meantime, the Syrian delegates, at least
vooally, support the Agency programs as they help to imgrove
refugee living wnditions and to save the refugees from ofmplete
19
moral degredaticm and physical deterioration* ^
Syrian representatives, like those fr<m other Arab States,
in resisting any solution except repatriation, claim to be only
safeguarding the ri^t of the refugees as guaranteed by the
United Mations, 3o far as considering any other solution, it
would be illusory vdthout taking into account this rig^t of the
refugees. Until the Israeli Government agrees to the imple
mentation of jg»reviou8 U. H. resolutions, and particularly to the
solution outlined in Eesolution 194(111), there can be no

20
basis for negotiations.
Syrian representatives do admit that no one denies the right
of a state to decide whether immigration constitutes a threat
5th session. Ad Boo Political Gomnittee, 34th
Meeting (Bovmnber 6, 1950), P« 205»
7th Session, 391st Plenary Meeting (Novanber 6,
1950), p. 131.
^^GAQH. 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political C(xnmittee, 27th
Meeting (Wovembeir 6, 1953)* P» 129#

-14to the security of a State. However, even this ri^t would
not apply in the case of Ispe al where the refugees would just

21

be crossing the border to reenter their own country.

The Syrian representatives have noted in U. K. debates
that the inweasing eoonomio development of the host countries
would provide a greater opportunity for paid work by a large
i

number of the refugees. However, they have also oautioned that
these opportunities should not be closely linked with the
rehabilitation of the refugees or made (dependent on it, <a?
political complications mi^t arise such as those which have
prevented the ii^ilmwntatitm of various large-scale works
projects during the years.
Oa. the subject of c^qiensatlan, the Syrian dele^tes feel
that Ittpaeli officials have applied so imny reservations and
conditions as to mmunt to a refusal to pay*

They also feel that

the Israeli Govermient intends to use the compmisation issue to
force the Arab States to negotiate œa Israeli

As

stated by one Syrian Calegate in 1950, "Israel's ^jvemn^nt is
prepared to distmss compezmation, but not to take measures to
bring it about,*'^^ This feeling has persisted to the present.
91

GAQË. 9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 36th
Meeting (Sovember 29, 1954)» P» 168#
po
GAOB. 11th Session, Special rolitioal Committee, 29th
Meeting (February 20, 1957), p. 134.
5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Conaaittee, 66th
Meeting (December 1, 1950), p. 430*
^^GACIf, 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 68th
Meeting (iieceiaoer 4» 1950), p. 441.

-15A3 for iixab property in Israel, there should be e receiver to
collect any rent or revenue f.*ora the property.

The money collected

uould be applied toward reducing the U, N, relief budget. Such
action would be justified, since at the time of PartitiCMi, Israel,
or the Jewish population of Palestine, possessed only

of

the land area in Palestine. The remainder of the property and
land still belongs to the refugees, who ere now living on inter—

25
national charity.
Compensation, as against income from the
proper-^, is the right of an individual owner, however, and
cannot be tunaed over to a reintegration fund.^^ The Israeli
Government's excuse of financial problems and economic boycotts
as reasons for not paying compensation are equally invalid. The
economy of Israel is based on Arab wealth and property and on
27
donations ficon the international oonmunity.
The Syrian delegates have felt that the Jewa are attempting
to use the refugee problem as a barfining factor in their
quest for further tœrritorial expansion. This is bome out by
the annexation of the Casa Strip being a condition of an Israeli
repatriation offer, as the acquisition of more territory was

28
the only way Israel could absorb so many extra persons.

Bven

if the refugees are economically inte^ated into the host
^^GAOR. 9th Session, Special Political Conmittee, 30th
Meeting (November 22, 1954), P. 137*
^^GAOR, 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Conmittee, 63rd
Meeting (November 30» 1950)» P* 408#
9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Coimnittee, 36"tti
Meeting (November 29, 1954)» P. 169.
28

GAPE. 4th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 54th
Meeting (November 22, 1954), p. 138.
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countries, aa Israeli officials v/ould like, they are still
refugees aa long as they ara unablo to return home, according to
29
'n representatives.
Though the Syrian Government is probably the niost militant
of the four main ilrab host governments, the other three states
involved are equally adamant on many of the issues, Hone of the
/irab States is willing to take responsibility for the beginnings
of the conflict. Before 1967, no host government acknowledged
a permanent solution other than repatriation, Bor are any yet
willing to begin individual negotiations with the Israeli
Government,
ii^gVDtiaa Position
i)gyptian delegates feel that little honest attanpt has
been lUide to solve the refugee problem, but believe that as
long as the refugees are kept f^om their homes, they are the
responsibility of the United Nations.

The delegates also

claim that Jewish ImnigratlKm has been a calculated move by
Israeli Zionists to rid Israel of its Arabs and to prevent their
return. In-migration of Jews has made the Implementaticm of
various U, N, resolutions impossible.^
The refugee problem was a direct consequence of the inte3>->
vention of the United Nations in the Palestine conflict and the
^^GAOH. 9th ïàession, Ad Hoc Political Comnlttee, 30th
Meeting (November 22, 1954), P« 138.
OIL# 1 #h oession, Special Political Gœmnittee, 131st
Meeting (November 13, 1959), P« 114#
^GAOfi, 9th Session, Ad Hoc Political Gwmlttee, 31et
Meeting (November 23, 1954), P» 139*

-17U. E., together with Israel, will remain responsible until a
just and lasting solution is found, according to the .Egyptian
r

r -tentative. The question of relief, one issue of the larger

problem, should be considered as a political, rather than a
humanitarian, matter,

Follov/ing this line of reasoning, the

Egyptian spokesmen have not hesitated to criticize UMV/A, from
its slender budget to its proposed rehabilitation and reset
tlement projects. An Egyptian delegate in 1952 stated that the
economic development of the Mddle (vast was the affair of the
states in the area;

they should be left to work out their own

plans without foreign interference,^ Some of this "fOTeiga
interference" refers to the eocistenoe of the State of Israel,
Egyptian officials have also maintained that the presence
of the refugees in all of the host countries has imposed a
great hardship on these countries. The refugees* presence has
brought a considerable drop in wages and in overall standards
of living. To support this contention, the Egyptian delegate
pointed out that in Palestine the minimum daily wage of an
agricultural worker had been $1,00, In Jordan in 1953» the
comparable wage was 1,28, end in the Gaza Strip, 1,15»^^ Althou^
much is made of the miserable conditions in which the refugees
live,

little mention is ever made, at least by the Arab

^GAQR, 6th Session, Ad Hoc Political Conanittae, 44th
Meeting (January 18, 1952), p, 247#
^^GAQR, 8^ Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 25th
Meeting (Kovera'oer 4, 1953), P« 120.
•^n 1953 eaWi refugee received relief from UElt.VA amounting
to i,03 per day. Five cents of this amount was spent on food. (See

rôi>resentatives, of the ixgeacy's often r^paated contention that
the refugees have a standard of living and an education somewhat
- than that of most of the inhabitants of the host states.
"Ê^ptian officials have also criticized the ConcHiatioa
Coimniasion* s efforts to obtain the release of blocked accounts,
calling this step an inversion of the logical order in dealing
ftlth the refugee problem by placing it before the questions of
repatriation and compensation.
Lebanese roslticm
Lebanese represstatives feel that the problem of the
reftigees involves an entire people deliberately displaced from
their homes and replaced by alien elements from abroad.

They

maintain that the refugee problem is the core of a dispute
involving millions of people and is constituting a definite
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danger to world peace.

The time element «Aioh some hoped

would bring about a solution seans only to have provided for more
GAOË. 8th Session. Ad Hoc Political Committee, 25th Ifeeting
"(ÏÏomnber 4, 1953), p. 119.) By I966 the allowance for food
stuffs was $1.20 per pwson per month or about $.04 per day,
(See GAOB. 21st session, neport of the G(mnissioner-General
of the United Nations Belief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Hear jawt (A/6313), Supplement Number 13, 1966,
p. 8.)
^^GAOR. 7th Session, Ad Hoc Political Cosamittee, 25th Meeting
(NovembOT 25» 1952), p. I50.
^GAQR. 11th oession. Special Political Camlttee, 31st
Meeting (February 21, 1957)» P» 145*

15th Session, Speoiail Political Consnittee, 200th
Meeting ^N^ovember 25, I960), p. I48.

-19bittornesa,^ The Israeli representatives' implications tiiat
the Govomment has the right to permit the refugees to return
'

"hair homes, or not to return, is in no way supported in
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pertinent U. N. resolutions,
Israeli delegates' arguments
against repatriation oecause moot of the refugees are too young
to remember ralestine is strange logic, Lebanese representative»
feel, coming from representatives of a state most of whose
inhabitants are recent immigrante from abroad, and who are
claiming a land because it belonged to their ancestors ovot
2,000 years ago.^ Plus, riuoh of the land occupied by the
Israeli military after the 1948 War, (and a^in after the 195^
and 1967 ïars) is a direct violation of the provisions in the
original partition Resolution.'^
î.obanes© representatives have stated that the ri^t of
repatriation is a vested ri^t of the refugees, and the iirab
States have no way to dispose of that rig^t#

A rehabilitation

program to equip the refugees for resettlement is neither a final
nor a permanent solution to the question. Jven if the projects
were carried out, the only problem which would be solved would
be the relief problem. The works projects can never imply any
^gAOR, 11th Session, Special Political Gomoittee, 3l8t
Meeting (February 21, 1957)» P* 145*
^^GAOH, 14th Session, Special Political Committee, 152nd
Meeting (Zmvember 16, 1959)# P# 118,

^^GAOH. 13th Session, Special Political Committee, 109tii
Meeting (November 20, 1958), p. 102,
^GA02. ?th Session, 503rd Plenary Meeting (December 4»
1954), p. 351.
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surrender of the refugee#* ri^t to repatriation.

Lebanese delegates, like those of othw Arab States, do not
insist ao. faoe to fiaoe negotiations vith ^e Israelis* In faot,
they argue that the United Nations should take steps to solve the
refugee problem in line with General Assaobly 2#solutioim, but
wil&out direct negotiations.The Arabs, according to Lebanese
representatives, are basing their positions on legal considérati(ms,
Wiile the Israelis are recognising only tiie de facto situaticm*^
The Israeli Government*s refusal to allow #ie refugees to return
is based on the Zionist intent to create a Jewish State, hostile
to all nrnimJewlsh elements. The oriMitlmi of a Jewish State is
also Intended to justify expansionist ^litios to the world and
to make further conquest appear inevitable,
Jordanian PositiaB
The Jordanian Government, tWu^ iwobably the most willing
of the hosts to include the refugees in its national life, still
feels much the same as the other host w)untries. The q.ue8ti<m of
the ri^ts of the refugees should take precedence over the
question of regional peace.^ With reference to the militant
^GAOB. 9th Sesslw, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 38th
Meeting (Bovember 30, 1954)» P. 178.
6th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 44th
Meeting (January 18, 1952), p. 245#
'HgaCS, 7th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 28th
Meeting (Sovwaber 29, 1952), p. 159*
^%AOB« 9th Session, Ad Boo Political Committee, 36th
Meeting (November 29# 1954)* P, 170*
^GAQE. 17th Session. Special Political Committee, 360th
Meeting (Dewmber 3, 1962;, p. 179.
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refugee groupa, or fedayeen, the Jordanian representative drew
the parallel that if the "fedayeen are dis-torbing Israel, Israel
in turn is disturbing the whole Arab world."
For the Jordanian Gorwnmmit, the Palestine problmi has
three main aspectsi

the refugees, the territorial i%roblem, and

the problem of otmpensation. Beoause the attempts to settle the
refugee problwi have been made without reference to the terri
torial aspects of the probl^ no suooess has been aohieved*^
Israel's Government opened its frontiers to immigrants and
had settled than <m lands and in the hoams of the former Arab
populaticm* Peace in the area would be threatened until the
Israeli Government abandoned that policy, acoording to Jordanian
delegatesIsraeli officials' motivation in the release of
accounts nas not espeoially noble or generous, but was the
result of îwessure by the United KingdU»a and the banks which
had branches in the Arab Stat#» and were being threatrnwd with
having their holdings impounded.
Bents earned from former Palestinians' lands should be
plawd in a special fund for the benefit of the refugees, pending
a final settlement. If Israeli officials refused to cooperate
11^ Session, 644th Plenary Mwting (Januaiy 28,
1957), pT#?,
"^GAQR. 12th Session, Special Political Owomittee, 69th
Meeting (Hoveabar 26, 1957)» P* 122,
^%AQR. 5th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Tlat
Meeting (iiecember 6, 1950)t P» 457*
16th Session, Spe^al Political Owmlttee, 320^
Meeting (Decmaber 16, 1961), p. 322«

-22with a oustodiaa of such a fund, the membw states, which so
generously respond to Zionist appeals for funds, oould deduct the
same eumunts from these funds and apply this money directly to
the benefit of the refugees,
Five points were listed by the Jordanian i epresentative in
195Î es being essential to any solution. If anything, these five
points have become even more important aftar the 196? «/art
1* The establishmemt of a United Nations ofxaamissicm
for the oustodiansMp of Arab property in Isra^*
2* Return of the Arabs to that part of Palestine ^lich
the U* H« had decided would raomin Arab tera^tory*
3* Repatriation of those refugees wishing to return*
4. Paymmt of compensation to the others.
% The establishmMKt of intmrnation^ control of
2iioniat insaigratitm into Israel.^
Summary
Thou^ Arab representatives are agreW^ that the refugees
should be given a choice between return or «mpmamatitm, and
that the responsibility for the refugees* welfare until a settle
ment is reached belong to Israel and to the United Hâtions, they
do zuot agree on all of the o16er issues involve. Bach seems to
be placing its own desires above other considerations. For
example, the j^gyptian Govwnment refused to accept Israel's
offer for repatriaticm at least partly because the offer also
required Israeli administratixm of the Gaga Strip* laa^ael now
^^GAQfi* 12th Session, Special Political Gmmittee, 69#
Meeting (Bovwnber 26, 1957)» P* 122.
12th Session, Special Politioal Ccxmittee, 69th
Meeting (Hovembar 26, 1957)» P* 123.

-23oooupiôs the S^lp. Jordan, having the most accessible border
to Israel wants espeoially to limit Jewidbi imiigpati(m because
of her own security needs, real or imagined. Jewish Immigration,
to all of the Arab Governments, implies Zionist expansion.
Jordanian officials feel that they could loose more and more
territoxy. Thus, the Jordanian Government prefers to resolve
the territorial issue before the compensation issue or even the
total reAigee laroblem.
An observation by Dr. Joseph Jj. Johnson, made on cme of
his United Nations survey trips to the Middle East, gives one
possible reason for the lack of ^wernmental diplomatic success
during the past twenty years, fie notes that the Israeli leaders
can and do take much the same positions in piblic as in private;
Arab leaders, however, feel compelled to take strong and even
eitreme stands in public, although they may hold less ezlarwie
views privately.Israeli officials, basing their positimm
on the de facto situaticm, thus seim more ctmfident of #eir
positions than do their Arab counterparts. The Arab Governments,
in revising to accept the de facto si^iation and basing their
positions on the legality of United Hâtions resolutions, seem
to be arguing fr%! a weaker position. i<\>r, though the reso
lutions are binding, technically, they are in practice little
BKxre tkan recommendations whose success is based on the acceptance
of the parties involved. The Arab states representatives, too,
^^iir. Joseph S. Johnson, ••Arab vs. Israeli,** Sm Outlook.
February, 1964, p. 17.

-24are Ëur^îing not <mly for their governments, but also for the
displaced Palestinians living in their countries.
Yet, various other factors ai«i pressures semi to have had
more influence on the Arab Governments* positions than on
those of the Israeli Government, at least prior to the I967
War* Few Arabs favored the creation of the Jewish State; no
Arab State voted in favor of the Partition Hesolutioti. The
Arab States have now suffered three military defeats and several
have lost much of their productive or strategic territoiy. The
Arab Goverzments have also had to contend directly with the
restless and bitter Palestinians. Israel had only a handful until
the 1967
The Arab Govermmnts have been vividly aware of the refugee
poi»ilations within their borders sinw 194B. The refugees residing
in the Arab States have had a direct influence on many Arab
statements and beliefs. The Arab Govemiz^ts have Izwistad on
repatriation largely because this has been the refugees' desire*
The Arab Governments have also refused to accept resettlement, for
#ie refugees have been opposed to this solutxcm. However, by 196?,
the Arab host goverzments did seem more willing to try to
find a settlement*

Mich of this (diange in their earlier, more

adamant position was a direct result of the refugees' disruptive
influence on several of the hoot countries*
% 1967» two decades of dlsa^eement and diplomatic stale
mate had allowed time for the Palestinians to becmne partially
organized and to gain political status in the Middle iiiast. By

this time they had definite goals. And Palestinian desire» ware
différant from those of both the jlrab Governments and the Israeli
Government#

Two decades of inaction and exile were encm^ to

prove to the Palestinians that the Arab Governments were not the
allies the I'alestiniaos had hoped*

Thus, Palestinian leaders,

supported by the refugee masses, bs^n more and more to seek a
solution independent of any government.

CmPTEE III
ÏHE PAllDSTIKIAÎJS ABD THE UHIT£i) MTIOHS
The relationship between the Palestinian refugees and
the United Hâtions has been one of political turmoil since
1947* The humanitarian aspects have bew expected and exploited
by both the Arab Governs^nts and by the refugees. As the
United Nations Belief and »/orks Agency (UBHWA) was the only
means the Palestinians had for political expression until
recently, they often used and sabotaged UMÎWA probants as an
indirect expression of their political positions• Idany of
their positions, including the militancy of the oommando groups
today, havB been expressed more indirectly for some time* Yet,
it is not surprising that the refugees have only recently gained
political recognition as a party involved in the Middle East
conflict*
In the middle 1940*8, the Arab population of Palestine
was divided about ^0^ rural and

urban*

Most of this urban

gpoup-m-the professionals, educators and businessmen—had fled
Palestine shortly before the 1948 iVar so that they would not
be trapped by the events they fcKresav. About two-thirds of the
urban Palestinians had skills needed in the Arab States and
readily found employnmnt. These persons and their dependents,
or about 20p of the total displaced, have never been reliant

-27on thu United. Nations*^ The refugees who have been oared for
by the U. H, are, for the moat part, the agrarian population
of Palestine

a group tied to its land and suddenly v/ithout

land or any other visible means of support. Beoause of the
breaWovm in Palestinian social structure, brou^^t about by
the exodus and resettlement of the Palestinian elite, this
agrarian group has been left largely leaderless until the
early I960*s,
Shortly after the 194^ conflict, when it became evidmit
that th&re would be no short—term solution to the refugee
problem, the U. K# began taking steps to provide for this
segment of the former Palestinian population* Despite its
humanitarian endeavors, the U» B* has never been liked by the
refugee population and has endured imch criticism f^om the

2
refugees# The definition of nho is a refugee has been one
contested issue. The refugees, especially those in the camps,
feel that the definition should also include the Bedouins, or
Palestinian nomads, as well as the persons who lost either their
homes or their livelihoods, but not both. Thou^ the modification
of this definition has been proposed in the General ilssembly,
no revision has yet bec» made*
^AQB. 17th Session, Annual Eepoort of the Director of the
United Nations Belief and /orks Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the gear East (A/5214), Supplément Humble I4, p. 2*
^he United Hâtions has defined the term "refugee" to apply
to those persons living in Palestine for two years prior to the
wtbreak of the I94B conflict and isho lost both their homes and
their livelihood as a result of the War. (See GAOB. 9th Session,
Ad Hoc Political Committee, 29th Meeting (November 19, 195^4), P* 135»)

-28However, just speaking of the refugees contained in the
camps and supported by the United Nations does not seem to he
entirely representative. The Agenqy Director stated in 196?
that the number of persons in camps has never exceeded more 'Uian
40jb of the total refugee population.^ This figure hsis varied
onl5* sli^tly during the years as statistics show that in 1950
one—third of the refugees were living in some 60 camps and the
remainder were in the towns acwi villages of the host (xmntries.^
Typical of the refugees, both in and out of the camps, is
the "refugee mentality which the Agency's Director noted in
1954. Part of the "refugee mentality" results from the intense
individualism of the Palestinians and their minimal sense of
solidarity with their fellow Palestinians, Also typical is
their passive expectation of continuous benefits,^ The
refugees regard themselves as temporary wards of the inter
national consmmity, which they hold respcmslble for their pli^t.
They also feel this oonsmznity has a duty to enable them to
return to their hemes. In the meantime, however, the refugees
feel that the United Nations must provide for their welfare and
%AOR, 5th Enmrgency Special Session, Report of the Secretary.
General under General Assanbly Resolution 2252 (JS—V) and Securi^
Council Resolution 237 (196?)(A/6787), August 18, 1967.
^SAOR, 6th Session, Report of the Director of the United
Natloas Relief and V/orks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near Bast (A/1905), Supplement Number 16, p, 4*
^bid.. p. 5.
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meiintenanco.

As early as 1952, the Director of the Agency noted that
many of the refugees were ceasing to believe in a return to
Israel, or Palestine, However, he stated that this feeling
was not preventing them from insisting on a return. For, they
fait that to agree to consider any other solution would be a
7
sign of weakness and a relinquishing of a fundammtal ri^t.
Political Position
l^hroug^ the years, the refuses have felt that any attempts
to bring about their employment or reaettlm^nt would automatioally mean an end to theix olaim for oompenmation or repatri—
ati<m. Their distaste for nSBWÂ and its programs has been shown
by their laok of partiqipati<m in -ost instanoes*
The refugees themselves feel that today's iwoblem is a
political one. Mr* Izsat Tannous of the Palestine Arab Refugee
Office end a Arequmit participant in the United Hâtions debates
on the Palestine problwa has stated that the problma is not
simply an eoonomio one open to an eoon«nio solution. The problem
he feels cannot be settled siogply by canpensating the refugees
and integrating them into the lands outside of what was Palestine.^
Such solutions ignore the yearning and attachment of the Falestinp^GAQR. 13th Session, Report of the Gcmmissioner-General of
the United Nations Belief and ./orks Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East (a/5513). Supplement Number 13, p. 3#
"^GAQjR. 6th Session, Report of the Director of the United
Nations Belief and ./arks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near Sast (A/I905), 3upplem«at Number 16, p. 5*
^

.litioal Committee, 29t&

-30Isas for their village©, farms ajad social environmentB#
In 1961, the Agency Director stated that the feelings of
the refugees and of the local populaoe in the Arab host states
were generally parallel on the Palestine issue. In both segments,
he noted, bitterness and resentment were sispong. The Director

contiïmud that it was difficult to detect much difference
between the vietvs of the refiit'^ees who had been employed and
eelf-supporting for thirteen years and those ?Ao had beœi
languishing in oaxaps, or between these two groups and "Hie nœaArab refugees living in the Arab host states. Nor oould he
find evidence of a different feeling among the younger and the
older refugees. He also pointed out that for thirte^ years,
the feelings of the refugees had been oharaoterized by frustrac
tion, uncertainty, disappointment and hardship. In his opinion,
it was hardly a mtter of surprise if these refugees were
embittered and resentful and if they clamorred to return to
Palestine. He also expressed no surprise -Uiat they would be
9
supported politically by the Arab Govemmmits,

The refugee representatives idio have participated in the
annual Palestine debates feel that the Palestine probl«n is &
case of colonialism in its ugliest foMa, llr, làaile Ghory, the
delegate of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office, in I96I stated
%AQB« l6th Session, Annual Report of the Director of the
United Nations Belief and V/orks Agency for Palestine fiefu^es in
#ie Hear Bast (A/486I), Supplawnt Number I4, p* 2,

that novyhere outside of Palestine had imperialism displaced and
expelled an indigenous population ftom its homeland.^® Being
part of a developing area, the refugees' attitudes toward
colonialism were undarstandable, and the refugees' insistence
that the colonialist situation replacing a prior colonialist
situation be ended was hardly surprising, Thou#i this feeling
had been latent since 194Ô, it is being Repressed more and more
during the I960's.
Thou^ the refugees have no liking for the U, H,, <aae
of the possible solutions proposed by Mr, Ghory in I96I was
to use peaceful means through the U. H# Charter and inter
national law az^ jiistioe*

The reftxgees, like the Arab Gorerav-

ments, tend to place a great de^ of earphasis, thou^ no
particular hope, on a legal method of solution. The other po8*>
sible solution Mr. Ghory mentioned in 1^1 ims the i»ay of forw#
He added that the refugees hoped the tJ* H. would not ooa^el them
to use force, but if the organization proved unable to bring
about a jizst settlement, the refugees would be obligated to
liberate their country themselvesThus, the refugees did
forewarn the United Nations and the world (Ximmunity of their
current disruptive role and militant tactic#.
Mr. Ghory also stated that the Palestine problem ima a
conflict between the Zionist invadmrs and the Arabs of Palestine#
Thus, he, like Israeli officials, is making a two-sided issue
^%AOE. 16th Session. Special Political Cornaittee, 311th
îtoeting (December 7, 196I), p. 264.
^4bid.

-32oi" the problens. Yet he, and the refugees, feel that the
controversy is bet.vaen the i'alestiniana and the State of Israel.
The Israeli officials profex- to keep the problem on a governmen
tal level—between the Governcvents of Israel and the iirab States.
Thou^ the refugees welcome ^irab governmental assistance and
conoei'u, mr* Ghory continued that the Palestinians regard the
problem as essentially a mattor ./hich they themselves must
settle. The Palestinians have felt that the Arab States
would never exploit the refugee problem to further their own

12 Still, the refugees are more and more caning

ends, however.

to believe that the Arab Governments have not done eiiou^ to
bring about an agreeable solution.
Regarding finances, lïr. Ghory states that there is no need
to resort to charity to finance ule./a. Bather, a simple act of
justice would suffice. Turn over the lands and property of the
refugees to a custodian vdio \irould administer them and see that
the revenues ware paid to the legitimate owners.

In fact,

the Palestinians would wslcome the appointment of such a person
by the United Hâtions.
In i960 the Palestinian representative at the Cœmnitte©
debates declared that thu hopes of the refugees had recently
been rejuvenated. They had come to believe that the U. K. had
GAQR. I6th Session. Special Folltioal Gcmnlttse, 311th
feting (December 7, 1961), p.264»
^^bid,. p. 263.

^'^AOE. 15th Session, Special Political CcMomittee, 202nd
Meeting (November 17, I960), p. 126.
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changed substantially sinoe 1947 and would no longer tolerate
a situation whioh prevented the Palestinians from returning to
their homes. This ohange was brought about by the inoreasing
United Hâtions m^beœship from the third world in Asia and in
Afrioa whioh could sympathize with the Palestinians in their
IS
fight against oolonialism. ^ However, the Palestinian repre»
santatives have also shorn their pessimism hy repeating the
contention ^ïat the U. N. has a moral duty to attend to the
refugees' needs by continuing to provide for their subsistence.
Thus, though the U. N. created the ixroblem but is unable to solve
it, the United Rations still is, according to the refugees, held
responsible for perpetuating it by supporting the displaced
Palestinian population.
At the 17th Session, the Palestinian spokesmen declared
the Palestinians to bo & peaceful people who insisted on a just
peaoe.^^ With reference to the Jem occupying Palestine, the
representative outlined these feelings*
1. The Jewish authorities had no rights in the
occupied areas of Palestine other than those of
a tmaporary belligerent occupant and as admin
istrators under the lav/s of war. They had no
sovereignty.
2. International law uphcB. the principle that pri
vate property was inviolable and that all enoraoohraents on i>roperty constitutsd a vrax crime,
3. The Jewish authorities had oosmitted and had been
accessories in the coraadssion of acts against Zirab
private property and public assets which instituted
^G-aQS. 15th oQssion, Special.olitical Conuoittee, 202nd
Meeting (November 17, I960), p. 126.
^^GAQE. 16th làession, Special x'olitioal Committee, 31dth
Meeting (December 15, I96I), p. 305.

-34war orimma as reoognized by interoatloml law and
the United Hâtions.
4» Jewish authorities had x^ped advantages traa their
unlawful aots and (wuld not deny the ri^ts of the
Arabs to possess and enjoy suoh property and assets.
5* The United Hâtions was legitimately and morally
bound to reoognise and act in ocmformity with jus
tice and international law and bound to take action
recording #e Palestine problmn in general and Arab
private property in particular. The U. N. was
bound to protect, preserve and restitute -Uxe pro»
perty and should appoint a custodian to administer it. '
The representative continued that the refugro problem is only
a part of the Wwle Palestine problem. It is the tragedy of
a naticm temporarily displaced and determined to regain fuH
ri^ts to its homeland. That nation is ^e principal party
in the issue and no othw has the right to negotiate a peace
in dlmpegard of that faot.^®
At #e 17th Sessiiw, Mr. Tannous of the Palestine Arab
Refugee Office predicted that the patience and determination
of the Arabs would ultiimtely defeat all of their enemies. The
invading «pusaders, he pointed out, had tried for over I30
years to occupy Arab territory far beyond ^e limits of Pales
tine, but finally the Arabs had driven them out. The Zionist
invasion wuld end the same way, he predicted.
The feelings of the yofugeem and especially the mibittered
attitude of the younger generation were shared by the Arabs in
^^GAOa. 17th Session, Special Politioal Committee, 367th
Meeting (Deoamber 12, 1^2), p. 220.
^^GAOB. 17th Session, Special Political Committee, 369th
Meeting (Dec^ber 13, 1962), p. 236.
^^Ibid.. p. 235.

-35ganw&l, the Palestinian representative claimed in 1^0« Time,
he said, would nevw solve #i8 problem. Most of the refugees
WMpe w»ll indootrinated in their desire to return htwne. This
indoctrination resulted mainly from sotdu&lization throu#i the
stAools and throu^i oammmity life, espeoiaUy in the refugee
osmps. Most of the tea<Aers were refugees themelves; many
20

had been @%»loyed as te&câiez« in P^estine.

Thus, the United

Bâtions, in trying to aid the refugees was also keeping alive,
if not increasing, the temloms in the arwL.
Sduoation and Employment
Thou^ the Agency has tried many methods of assisting the
refugees, its educational facilities have been givem the mmt
attention and funds. This is because oducation is one of the
more isg^tant means of j^eparing the refUgew to become selfBuppœrting, n&erwwr they may ultimately live. As of 1957
all refugee children received an elemental^ education. Seoondaxy education was provided in propœption to that of the host
countries and teoènioal education was provided as funds were
available. Univers!^ education was available to a olwsen few*
However, though the Agency would and did provide the refugees*
education, it could not, for various reasons, provide mgployment to follow. Edu(»ti<m has been the end, not the nmans. It
has given the Palwitinians the means to advance, but there is

on
Â. L. Tibawi, "Visions of Betumt The Palestine Arab
EeAigees in Arabic Art and Poetiy," The Middle g^ast Journal.
Volume 17 (Autwm, 1963), p. 522.
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nowhere for thorn to go at present* Consequently, they have
beoome more and nxxre bitter#

Almost all of the youth nho

beoame dependent on UI3EWA in 194Ô have had some special training,

21
but as of 1961, only 3,000 ware selfniupporting*
Over cme
million refugees were still dependent on the Agenoy. Half of
the latter were over ei^teen years of age. Generally the
young admits sinoe ^ke I96O's have bemi more literate lâian their
parents«

Thus, tWy are better equipped to hold a job if the

opportunity arises. However, this same group is less skilled
in simply making a living. These youth have not had tbe oppor^
tunity to leam a trade or teohnioal skill through apprenties-»
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ship. HOT are they oonditiowd to working for a living.
Following the 1956 War, ^e education program was the only
part of the UMWA rehabilitation program whioh oontinued uninter*
rupted in many areas. As of 1969, the Director reported Idiat
eduoatimi had overtaken relief as the largrat Agency budget
item. It aooounted for 43^ of the expenditures.^^ Thus, with
the coopération of the refugees, the Agency has been able to
fashion a solid and acceptable eduoaticmal program. Its suooem
in finding employment to follow has been very limited*
As a meazuB of providing some income to the refuses so that
21
GAPS. 16th Sessi(m, Annual Report of the Director of tibe
United Stations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Hear Bast (A/486I), Supplement Bumber I4, p* 1.
^&bid.
^%AOH« 24# Session, Eepwt of the Commissioner-Geneiral of
the United Rations Belief and Works A^ncy for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East (A/76I4), Supplemwit Humber 14» P* 10*

they isl^t buy foodatuffs to suppléent their rations, the
Agency itself has long aaployed refugees whenever possible. These
Palestinian employees have a great loyalty to 1^e task of feeding
the refugees and administering to their daily needs. On oooasion
they have oalmed down the more eztrmoe elements of the oamps lAo
imnt to rejeot even the food provided. However, to the aeoomd
gwrpose of UMWA, the peaoeful resettlemwt of the refugees,
these Palestinian einployees are ne^tive. Mather, they like
their fellow refugem;, advocate taking kwdc their land and
"pushing the Jem into the sea."^^ Despite this adversity to
Âgenoy resettlen^t projects, UBBfA has recruited more and more
of its staff frtm among the camp populations. This has included
even its technical staff, and as early as September, 1950, «aly 133
of a staff of 6,071 were recmited inteamationally.^^
By 19$8, it finally became possible for the Agency to
assist the refugees in finding jobs in the Arab States, other
than those jobs available with the Agency, cm a more ocrgaa^zed
basis. Pw the first time, the Agency was able to help refugees
in Syria to find local mnploynmit. Oppwlamities for employment
also became available in the Gaga Strip as a result of imiKPOvwients
begun by the lâgyptian authorities and jobs connected with the
maintmiance of the United Hâtions i^o^gency Force (UK#'). A
placement service designed to assist refugees skilled in trades
H. Bagdikian, "Tragedy of Hatred," The Reporter.
Kovfflober 1, 1956» p. 32.
^^GAOS. lih Sessitm, Fifth Ccmmittee, 332zul Meeting
(November 3» 1952)» p. 59*
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and lETofessions to fiad work in nelggkboring oountries nas
maintainad. During 19$8 a&m 1,#0 job vaoanoiee were adver
tised by the Agency, More refugees found permanent employment
during this year than ever before. However, by 1969» the
Agency noted that employment prospeots for the graduates of il»
26
vocational schools were declining rather tlmn inoreaaing,
%
this time, too, the refugees «ere ccuaing more to feel that
placement services #we designed as disguised resettlemmit pro
jects and #mre becoming increasingly wary of seeking jobs,
Sesettlwmnt
While Agency educational endeavors have been accepted by
the refugees, this education has nurtured refugee independence
and awareness and seesas to have toazimized attitudes among the
refugee populati<si Wiich are adverse to any permanmit soluticm
involving resettlmnent. That the refugees have not favored or
cooperated with Agency resettlement endeavors is substantiated
by owraaents of the Directors, Mr. John Blandford, the Agency*s
Director from 1951 to 1953 oozmented that the Agency's functions
to help improve the living conditions of the refugees, to enable
than to become self-supporting and to provide hope of social and
economic recovery vvas a difficult taslf, even when the Agency
stated specifically that its assistance did not prejudice the

26
gADR. 24th Sessicm, Report of the Commissionar-Oeneral of
the United Nations Belief and dorks Agencer for Palestine Refugees
in the Bear East (A/76I4), Supplement Dumber 14, p, 35*
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refugees' ri^t to repatriation or ofmjpwmatlon.

In his report to the Bi^th Se#8l<m, Mr* Leslie J, Carver,
the Aoting Jlreotor of the Agency, stated that results were
disappointing with regard to the Agency's plan of careating jobs
to help the refugees to beocan© self-supporting. He noted that
imre time than antioipated had elapsed in deoiding on specifio
self-support projects. He also commented on ijie virtual unanlW.ty
with which the Mfugees had told him they would accept nothing

but a return to their homes as granted then in General Assembly
Hesolution 194(111).^®
At a (inference with the representative of the relVigees in
Jordan in 1955» the spokesmen refHised all resettlement projects
and insisted on repatriation in line with previous U. N, resolutitms. In Lebanw, in the same year, the refugees resisted
efforts to improve their shelter because they suspected that

29
improved shelters were a disguised resettlenfânt project.
During
the years, trees have been uprooted in camps after they were planted
by the Agmoy because the refugees resented any action suggesting
that the oas^ was anything but a transitory stage leading to
%
repatriation.
^^GAOE. 7th Session, Ad Hoc Political Conmiittee, 3rd
Meeting (Ootober 23» 1952), p. 9*
28
8th aessicm, Ad Hoo Political Committee, 23rd
Meeting (November 2, 1953), p. 113.
^%AOE. 10th Session, Ad Hoc Political Consnittee, 14th
Meeting (Hwamber 15, 1955)» P. 54.
^^Tibawi, OP. cit.. p, 510»
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Time does not sem to have changed this attitude, yet it
does seem to have reduced the refugees* patimioe in waiting for
a solution. Tima has also maximized the lack of refugee confi—
danoe in the United Rations. Cmnps erected close to cities have,
over the years, become part of the adjoining tovms and generally
have turned into slums. The oamps in the country, thou^ providing
few positive opportunities for the refugees, have generally
turned into villages. The demand for farm hands on a seasonal
basis has helped improve the lot of this group which generally
has a more optimistic outlook than the refugees in or near the
cities* The more urban oai^p inhabitants have had the fewest
opportunities for «aployiaent. This situation has had a negative
effect on their standard of living, their feelings and their
interest in their surrounding.^
The situation of the refugees living outside of the oamps
is not necessarily superior ftom the viewpoint of housing or
eoonomios, but their social and cultural position seems better.
The refugees and their children are less bitter. But, they do
have problems peculiar to their oircumstnao^* (kie of the
l^rimary ones is that their non-refugee neighbors dislike them and
often prefer not to maintain any social relationships with
•^2
refugee families.
^Atallah Mansour, "The Arab Refugees and ilChat They fant,"
Hew Outlook. Decanber, 1^7, p. 25.
^Ibid., p. 26.

The Agency has also bean v/illing, althou^ disorlmlnating,
in supporting projects requested by the refugees. Several camps
have, with Agency support, built their own mosques. In several
instances, the Agency has simply provided roofing. A vegetable
market was requested as a project for the largest refugee caiqp
in Jordan,

The refugees, vAan left to their own ideas and

supported in these ideas by the Agency, have done naich to make
their camps more permanent living places. Yet, they have re
lented jauch the same ideas when su^ested by UEfHWA,
iiespite the fact that one of the obstacles to making the
refugees self-supporting is the refugees thaimelves, the Agency
has still found that most of the refugees, as individuals, are
vdlling to wrk when the opportunity is presented and especially
if they can keep the U. H. ration cards on which they have come
to rely. Small ^arojects, particularly those not requiring changes
in the social structure to guarantee some benefits, have been
most successful.^
Success of ffioall resettlmient projects has been most notice
able in Jordan. Two small agricultural projects were started on
State lands. Part of the project was to establish a series of
border settlements and resettle those vho had lost their homes,
but not their lands. The projects which will eventually resettle
^^AQR. 13th Session, Annual Report of the Director of the
United Nations Belief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Hear East (A/3931), Supplement Mumber 14» p. 19*
^^Don Peretz, "The Arab EeAigee Dilemma," Foreign Affairs.
Volume 43 (October, 1954)» P» I48*

5,000 refugee families have been well received»

As early as 195Î the Director noted "tiiat a shift in Uie
overall refugee attitude was beconing noticeable. There were
increasing requests for assistance in individual self-support
projects and a substantial rise of interest in vocational
training of all types. There VTBTG even a few requests far more
and better housing,^ The reAtgees to the jExresent, however, have
continually rejected the types of self—support projects which
have political implications such as the Yannuk-Jordan Valley
irrigation projects.
To date the small scale projects offer little long-term
hope as a solution to the Palestine and refugee problems. For,
these projects have absorbed less than the natural in&rease of
the refugee population. Yet, because there is no stlgom of
resettl«Bent attached to smaller scale projects, the refugee
yj
leaders can afford to lend their support.
The underlying consideration of XWMk in stressing reset
tlement grojects has been that participation of the refugees in
constructive projects would arrest the development of a "profession
al refuse raentalil^ and the demoralizing effects of the refugee
camp surroundings. Also, if such projects were successful, the
cost of relief would be reduced. However, without refugee coopw^^Ibid.. p. 146.
^GAOR, 12th Session, Animal Report of the Director of the
United Mations Eelief and works Agency for Palestine Eefugees in
the Hear 2ast (A/3686), Supplement Bumb&r I4, p* 4*
^^Popetz, OP. cit.. p. 148,

-43resettlen^t projects are doomed. For, the iixab Governn^nts will not act against l^e wishes of the refuse population,
largely for fe&r of political and military repureussions by
the refugees,
Chanises itolng I960* a
Despite the upheavals and uncertainties of the refuses,
"Uie Agencgr Director reported in 1969 that a great majoril^ of
the young people seemed to want to complete their training airà
acquire skills to help them find employimnt and thereby aid
thmmelves and their famille».^ The smaller projects becaae
increasingly successful as the Palestinians seemed willing to
give up the security of the oB«aps for a definite and tangible
alternative within their realm of experience#

However, nearly

all still prefer refugee status to a gamble on an experim^t
beyond their comprehension*

The sn»ller projects, too, are

largely self—sustaining and require little or no inter-govem—
mental cooperation, which is virtually nw-exlstent.^
This interest in smaller projects, thou^ still with the
consideration that the projects do not prejudice the refugees*
right to repatriation or oompensatiwi, does give those isho
migrate successfully more chance of adjusting to the wnoept of
resettl«aent#

Such migrants may eventually give up their desire

24th Session, Report of the Commissioner-General of
the United Nations Relief and .orks Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near iiiast (Â/76I4), Suppl^ient Number I4, p. 7#
^^Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (..ashington,
D, C.» The Middle East institute, 193^}» P* zë*
p- 29.

to return to

However, this does not aeum to bo

the case as yet.
jiather thex'j ai-o still maiiy refugoes, both

In

and out of

the oaaps, who are militant afxd increasingly aiitagonistic toward
tha Dtate of Israel. The oam^;8 and villages of the rofugees are
often descriued as breeding places of unrest in the middle i^aat*
This unrest is soai by teachers in the refugee schools in ^arti—
oular»^ /aid, the United ^atio^z* once it provides the education,
cannot convince the refugees to participate in large—scale
resettlement projects, nor can it provide enou^ work on stialler
scale projects to 3e_,. ûj the camps.
The "ralestine conscience" or ialostinian nationalist
feeling which has developed during the years has found a focus
in the guerilla orgmiiaations whose members are recruited from
the refuge© population. The guerilla organisations, unlike the
United Nations, seem to have gained a quiok and universal accep
tance among the caaip populations.'^^
In 1969, Laurence Liichelmore, present Commissioner-General
of UÎGi.VÂ, admitted that the coiaciandos had taken over six Agency
buildings in several Lebanese camps. He added that finding funds
for the Agency's work is becoming increasingly difficult, partly
^?r0d C. .Jruhns, "Ui ûtudy of iirab iiefUge© /attitudes," The
lôiddla East Journal, Volume $ (Spring, 1955)t P* 137*
^"Inside tha Arab Camps," The Christian Century, l^âay 11,
I960, p. 567.
Issues Before the 24th General Ass^bly,** International
Conciliation, dumber 574 (September, I969), p. 27.

-45b&oausd of the strength and influence of guerillas in the csmpa
and the oorresponding international unwillin^ess to support the
o^noando movement for fear of escalating the conflict* Mr*
Michelmore also stated that it is UBEv/Â's responsibility to
provide food, shelter and other necessities, but that policing
the camps and maintaining law and order is the responsibility of
the refugees and of the Arab Governments. Though some of the
camps are used as training caters for the oomaandos, the United
Hâtions disclaims all responsibility for the actions of the
inhabitants•^
fhough the refugees have caused problems for UKE#., they
have also gained a political status in the United Rations. Rather
than just hearing a Palestinian refugee representative, the
General Assembly has been hearing spokemnen of one of the comnando
organisations, the Palestine Liberation Or^utiistation, since I965.
In 1965 the Arab representatives first asked that this group
be heard as the official represmitatives of the Palestine people.
They noted that there mm a distizust difference in the political
W]^city of the individuals heard by the General Asswtbly since
1952 (representativwa of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office) and
the delegations representing the Palestinians directly throu^
the Palestine Liberation Organisation.^^ Since then these
reixresentatives have been invited to speak annually,
^^he Christian Science Monltw. November 20, 1969, p. 4.
^%AOB. 20th Session. Special Political Committee, 434th
Meeting (October I9, 1965), pp. 1-7#

-46These spokesmen, like their predeoessors, hold the opinion
that the ri^t of the refugees to return hon^ is uncontestable.
They feel that the Partition Resolution was illegal and undemooratio and maintain that the United Nations is more an aneny of
the Palestinians than a friend. Suoh plans as the Johnsmi Plan,
which provided for eoonomio development of the area and oonaequent resettleront of the refugees, would only provide for a
complete fragmentation of the Palestinian people as a political
and ethnic group. The refugee representatives claim that this
type of solution to the refugee problem would not lead to a
termination of the larger Palestine problaa.^
Summary
Âlthou^ UBIWA has done a needed job in maintaining the
reft&gee population, it also seems to have perpetuated the
Palestine conflict. Throu^ its inability to sell the idea of
resettl^aent, UNEWÂ has allowed the refugees to remain in the
camps, many of idiioh have recently been turned into oommando
bases. Though educated, the refugees are unable and unwilling
to channel their energies into constructive »ots and have
tended to a more destructive course—to destroy the present
State of Israel and to replace it with acma type of a new
Palestine.
Bad the United Nations concentrated as hard on a political
solution as on the humanitarian x^oblems, much of the current
46rt.,rtTi

o—^Political Gcmoittee, 442nd

-47clleamit mi^t have been avoided*

However, looking baok <m

refugee relationships with the United Bâtions and on refugee
positions expressed during General Ass^bly debates, one can
hardly be surprised at the growth of militanoe aimng the refugees
or at their growing influence in the Middle East.
The refugees have never liked the United Nations which they
blame, at least partially, for their displacement. Nor have
they bean grateful for the subsistence and aid provided by
UMSIA. Rather, they have c<xne to expect and demand such service
as their right. In return, they have not cooperated, except
subtly, with Agency resettlement endeavors. Instead they have
used the United Nations, the Agency, and especially the education
services to recreate a Palestinian ocmmnity and Palestinian
nationalist feeling. This Palestinian c<xmmmity ham now become
a disruptive influence to the area.
The regionail governments, throu^ their failure to reach a
solution, must bear at least part of the responsibility for this
Palestinian socialisation. % their inaction in finding a settle
ment, they necessitated the ^arolongaticn of the U. B. aid to the
refugees. The refugees, once it became appartint that no solu
tion was readily fortho(«ning, began to shape Agency services to fit
their own goals. At the same time, they resisted resettlement
projects as these implied they had given up #ielr hopes of return.
The concept of return to Palestine has became the main goal of
the former Palestinians. How many would actually choose to retUrzi, if given a choice, is unknown. However, basing their claims

••4S-"
on legal positions resulting from U. K. resolutions,

refugees

have capitalized on an issue which has strong emotional overtones.
In order to pursue their goal of return, the refugees have
TOre and imre turned U. H« servioee from the original intent
of providing subsistence and facilitating resettlement. Instead
the refugees have formed militant groups f^om among the camp
inhabitants and have turned some refugee camps into guerilla
bases. These c<mnando groups have, particularly sine» the 196?
War, be%i the leaders in the oampaiga to return to the area
which «as Palestine.
The humanitarian services provided by the United Bâtions
as a temporary measure have become semi—permanent. These
services to feed, clothe and educate the refugees have given
the Palestinians the tools to revive a dwmant culture. Al
though the intent was humanitarian, it has been givai political
overtones by the Arab Governments, the Israeli Government and
the Palestinians. Coupled with governmental political deadm
lock, the Palestinians have been able to ^in a significant voice
in the Middle Bast problem and in M.dclle E&stsrn gcvemzimntal
polides.
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PALSSTINIM OBGAÎÎIZATIOS
The so-called "refugee mentality" is one common bond
for the former Palestine comzmnity. One characteristic feeling
of this refugee mentality ia the ^Palestinians' desire to regain
their homeland. Since the beginning of the I960*s, at first
with the aid and encouragement of the Arab States, and present
ly BK>re spontaneously, this desire has been focused in or^uw
ized and often militant refugee organiaations. The estimated
numbers of these groups varies from 27 to 40.^ Of this
number, however, ottly four have any appreciable influ«noe on
the area; the i alestine Libopation Organization (PLO), Al
Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PPLP),
and Thunderbolt* Estimates of their total guerilla strength
range fr<w» 3,000 to 15,000,^
Palestine Liberation Organization
One of the first consiando groups to be formed was the PLO.
It was established by the Arab States Summit Conference in I964
as the official voice of the Palestine people. The Arab States
^See "Make Them Q^uakei" Hewaweek. Jamiary 13, 1^9, p. 40,
and The Christian Science Monitw. June 4» 1969, P» 1.
See "Make Them Hviakel" p. 40, and "Growing Threat to
Israel—^ew-^tyle Commandos," U. S. Nero and World Report.
January 13, 1969, p. 10.

-50gar© it financial support and q^iiasi-diplomatio status. Itc
main governmental patron was suad still is the United /txab
lieiiublic. Its constituency among the Palestinians was

At first, the rjjj was re^xded quite cynically by the middle—
claas Palestinians, althou^ it is now more generally accepted»
In September, I964, the Axab League approved the PLO's plan to
recruit a Palestine Liberation AxExy from among the refugees
This zmzgr ims <»noeived as an integral part of the Egyptian
led Unified àxab Military C(%ma&d mid was to be a vanguard in
the Arabs* battle against Israel, fhe Palestine Liberation Arigy
was voted $15 million by the Arab States. Training facilities
were offered by Egypt in the Gaaa Strip and Sinai Peninsula»
uyria and Iraq also offered training aresus to the Palestinians*
In Mar<^, I965, the organization announced conscription of all
residents in the Gaza Strip nom oetween 1937 and 1944 and
sobeduled summer training for stxne 6,000 refugee students*^
The PLO at the time of its establishment was more than just
a means to placate the refltgees and contain anti-Israeli feeling
^Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Eesistance Movemeuti
Its Significance in the Middle iSast Crisis," The Middle East
Journal. Volume 23 (Sumner, I969), P» 297»
tcbid.. p. 294.
^efu^roes in the Middle Bast; A Soluticm in Peace.
Israeli Information Services CBcwr York, 19&7)* P« 24.

-51axxtxig them. It ima also designed to implement the Arab jlaxt
to prevmit Israeli use of the Jordan waters for lrri@ati<m«
Siaœ 1^4 ^e PLO has been officially recognized by the Arab
League and most Arab GovenaMBts as the spokiMuaan for all of the
Palestinians.^ AM since 1964, the president of the PLO ham
been accorded a plat** as Chief of State representing the Pales
tine entity at meetings of the Arab League.^ Ahmad Shul^ii^, con
sidered one of the best mob orators in the Middle Bast, first
headed the organization. The presmt leader is Tasir A]%fat«
Though the Arab States have granted staWs to Uie PLO,
o^er, parti<mlarly Israel and A1 Fatah, have considered it
meorely a facade. Its freedom of action is somewhat limited by
9
depeiuienoe on the Arab Governments for mtmey and supplies*'^

EowevKP, the PLO does have ambitious, if somewhat contradio—
tOTy goals. Although its title indiwtes its main goal is to
liberate Palestine, Shukairy cmce stated his or^U!iizatl(m*s
policies toward Jordan by saying "before the liberaticai of
Palestine, Jordan will have to be transfcmaed into a military
base after being liberated." He also ctmwnted that "the first
target is Jordan, not Israel."^®
^"Issues Before the 20-tii General Assambly," International
Conciliatl<w. Mo, 554 (September, I965)» P» 43.
'
Fred J. %ouri, Thft ArmWTnrftal 1
Syracuse (Tniversi^ ftess, 1963), p. 112.

(Syracuse, N.Y.,

^J. H. Huizinga, "The Palestine Refugees* Perennial Source
of Trouble," The apporter. May 18, 1)67, p, 34*
^"Arafat in Command," The Economist. February 8, I969, p. 25.
Viewpoints," New Outlook. January, I967, p. 3.

-52Rôferriûg to a future Palestinian State, one

g.^oketman

said, "lie do not intond to drive thera (the Israelis) out as
they drove us out. v/e think that there is room in Palestine for
six million Palestinian .Irabs and Jews. The only condition is
that they accept to live as peaceful citizens."
himself, before I967, hoped that a result of guerilla war would
not necessarily be the direct liberation of Palestine, but that
it would provoke Israeli officials into a large—scale counter
attack and, as a result, the Government would incur international
condemnation as an aggressor. He also hoped to provoke the
Israeli military into attacking Jordan, annexing the ;/est Bank
and thus acquiring more rebellious Arabs than the country could
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contain.
The Israeli military did occupy the ./est Bank in
1967, but Shukairy's hoped for results have not been realized.
The Palestine Liberation Army, before I967, was reputed to
be of the hi^est quality. In theory, this Army was on offer
to any of the States bordering Israel. In practice, the offer
lay fallow because of the mistrust betwe«i the Arab nations.^^
The Army was decimated in the June, 1^5?, #@r. By I969 it
had been partially reorganized and units imre stationed in

^^Wdson, OB. oit», p. 304.
Carthew, "For the Arabs, Israel Does Rot Exist,"
The Kw York Times Magazine. i-Kcjjriber 18, 1969» p. 31*
^Make Them Q.uaket*' p. 40.

-53Throughout its history the ?L0 has been more oloselj/ tiad
to liiddl© iJastorn govermaents than any of the other oommando
groups. Following the 196^ /ar, the organization has been
under constant pressure from President lasser to merge with
the Egyptian oontrolled paper organisation "Heroes for the
Liberation of Sinai.
Thuadegbolt and the PomJLar Front
T&amderbolt, kziom as "Saiqa" in Arabic, ia one of the
maaller, but more militant of the (X»amaado groups. It wm
formed in Kov«mb«r, 1^71 &s the consolidation of several Syrian
terrorist groups. It is entirely Syrian controllM and equipped,
but beoause of relaxed Syrian policies toward the guerillas, does
have a great deal of latitude in its actions. It is widely dis
liked by many Arabs and Palestinians became of its extreme anti—
Hasser orientation and its dose ties with the most fanatic
elements of the Syrian Baa-fâi Party.It is most active on
the Syriaa-Jordan border and alcmg the Jordan fiivor.^^ Its
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strength is estimated at 1,500 men,
The Popular Promt for the Liberatim of Palestine was the
product of a 1967 merger of several enaller Arab based terrorist
groups and is headquartered in Beirut* Demanded by a former
Syrian army captain, Ahmad Jibril, the PRLP has training camps
^%bld.
^^Ibid.
^^ffiidson, OP. cit.. p. 297,
^^"Growing Threat to Israel—Hew-Style CœaaandoB," U, S.
Bewg and World Beport. January 13, I969, p, 10,

-54Bcsttered throughout Lebanon in refugee villages. The dive aion
of an 131 A1 jet to Algeria in July, 1963, and the attack on
an El A1 ^0^ at Athena airport in January, 19^9» are its most
19
inqpreaaive claims to date. ^ The main methods of the Popular
Front have been to organize inaide occupied areas and carry out
spectacular acta of terroiism against Israeli citizens, The
Front's leadership claims a ooomitment to inculcating a revo
lutionary, egalitarian spirit among the Palestinians as well as
the indigenous Arab population. In addition to attempts to
organise inside occupied territory, it seeks to establish "liber-
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ation" beachheads in the more conservative Arab States#

The Popular Front, like the FLO consideis the State of

21 It also con

Jœcdaa as much of an eneiqy as it does Israel*

siders the PLO too much of an offspring of the Arab League to
be able to represent the Palestinians. Rather, the PFLP would
like to see an organization oonprising all of the commando groups
in a broad federation with all of the active groups on equal
footing. Such an organisation, Popular Front leadership feels,
would provide for a more auccessful stinig^e against Israel»
However, the BYont is itself split three ways*

the non-political

fitting group, one moderate political wing and one îJarxist
22

wing.

Yet, its guerilla force is one of the largest, totalling

^^"kake Them i^uakel"

p. 40.

^^udsoa, op. dt.. p. 299.
^^Ibid.. p. 300,
Arafat in C<Mnmand," p. 25»
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approxiisataly 2,000 men.

AI Fatah
AX Fatah is the largest and oldest of the major resistance
organisatioas; it is also the most active group today. It was
founded in 1956 as a sewet sooie^, but did not begin active
operations agaimit Israel until 196$# Fatah is ocmaitted to the
libm^ation of all of Palestine frc® Zionist political control
and its leaders believe the only zmans is axti^ violence. 'Co
Fatah "libei%ti(m" means not only the destruction of the inQseoDialist base of Israel, but also the eradication of Zionist
socieV hy spiking at its Industrial, agricultural and financial
institutions.^^ One of its primary mmns to achieve its ^>al
is to keep alive an etm>tional attachment of the younger refugees
to Palestine as a natimml "honfâland."^^
i'atah was originally sponsored b;/ the Syrian uovernment,
Syrian officials have made it plain that they hoped to provoke
war by enwuraging sabotage by the comnandos. Though the main
Fatah bmaes have been in Syria, the organization has precipitated

tensions in the Arab wrld by crossing to Jordan and Lebanm to
stage its raids on Israel rather than trying to cross the more
26

hi^ily fortified Israeli-Syrian border.

A1 Fatah, at least initially, represented The marginal
Growing Threat to Israel," p. 10.
^•^udson, OP. pit., p. 299»

^^Fred J. Khouri, "The Policy of Retaliation in Arab—Israeli
Relations," The Middle Bast Journal. Volume 20 (Autumn, I966),
p. 440.
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Falestinlaas—the imemployed, young, both educated and uneducated,
who were prey to deliberately inculcated hatred and had a desire
for botii glory and money.After the 1967 War, Fatah*a
popularity spread to more diverse groups. Saudi Arabian King
Feisal*8 wife gave 14»500 to the organization. Arab you-Ui now
28
peddle Fatah stamps like Christmas seals.
From the refugee
camps and the universities, which are often staffed with zealous
Palestinian professors, come more recruits than Fatah needs. The
organisation accepts mostly Palestinians, and then only those who

29
can pass rigorous medical and ^ychiatric tests.
Today
Fatah has a fitting strength of about 5»000.^
Like the other fedayeen gzxxups, Fatah is most secretive
about its leadership. It is said to be ruled by a committee of
wealthy civilians in Damascus. As Fatah grew and begmi to feel
a need for a visible spokesman, Yasir Arafat became the ambass
ador extraordinaire to the Arab world, chief fund raiser for the
organization and field cœmander in Jordan.^
Following the 196? War, Fatah became better armed than
before, and at the expense of the Arab hosts. After the Uar,
Fatah teams took camels into the Sinai desert to oolleot the
machine guns, rifles, bazookas and grenades left by the retreating
Shlomo, "The Heal Eesistanco," Hew Outlook. January,
1968, p. 46,
pA
"The Guerilla Threat in the Middle East," Time, December
13, 1968, p. 31.
^^Ibid.. p. 32.
Growing Threat to Israel," p, 10,
3I|itjiq Guerilla Threat," p. 31*
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Fatah leaders do not fear renewed aggression by Israel
against Egypt or any other Arab State; rather they feel that they
oould profit. Mostly they are concerned that there rni^t be a
diplomatic settlement.Fatah officials do not expect to de
feat Israel directly or alone. Rather they plan to wage a
prolonged campai^ of violence against vital institutions of
the Israeli State, being careful to avoid any situation ./here
the Israeli military ca^t profit from its superior organization
14.
and technology.
Yet, even the June War helped Fatah» It
cz^ated a climate in tiAiich the Palestine question again became
35
the principle issue in the Arah world.

Once Palestine is liberated, opinions differ among i'atah
members as to the type of state vAiich will follow. One Fatah
spokesman declared that only the Jews who were in Palestine be
fore 1948, and their offspring, would be allowed to renain.^
Othors claim that no one will be driven out who is ready to
live under a ialestinian denwwacy.
Today the general trend within the, coimando movement is
consolidation under the leadership of Fatah. The formation of
^Xbid.
^^Sudson, OP. oit., p. 300,
^id.. p. 304.
^Ibid.. p. 299.

^Ibid.. p. 304.
^^iilias J. Khoury, ••Palestine and the National Liberation
Movements of the Third world," Student ./orld. Second Quarter,
1969, P. 130.
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th© Palestinian

-itriigglo Comaand, a fédération of the

ooiasiando organisations, in ^.^11, 1969» 't%8 intended to im-^vovs
tho military coo^wation among the guérillas, Hov/aver, cooper
ation has not improved greatly and auoh infighting and distrust
still exists. As one member of the more politically active
Popular J'ront said of Fatah, "Fatah is a blank sheet, ^Inyone
may vjrite on it vAat he wants," Fatah has virtually taken over
the eleven man executive oonanittee of the Gonaaand, It has four
members and holds the chairmanahip. The Comaittee tries to
neutralize the hostility of the dissident groups. The presence
on the executive ooninittee of members of the Syrian supported
Saiq,a group does not help to dispell hostilities. Other com
mando groups suspect this group of kee^in: tabs on thau for
38

the Syrian Government#

The infighting among the cosaaando

groups also contradicts the curi-ent guerilla philosophy of
39
"one enemy at a time is enough,"
General Guerilla Support
As a whole the guerilla movement is negative in t(me.
Mainly it ja^oiiwtes the destruction of the State of Israel, Yet,
the guerilla or^niaations, in recent nwnths, no longer have
to recruit members, but are receiving volunteers. Their rank»
are no longer solely Palestinians. Memhars now include foreign
^"iirafat in C<Mflmand," p, 25,
^^"The Guerilla Threat," p. 32.
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nationals and oven soma lower class Jews. îlost of this latter
group are Bastern Jews who are the subjects of disoricîination
in Israel by their /estemJewish oounterx^arts. These anti—
Sioniste sympathizo strongly with tho commando cause, but for
reasons different from those of the .lr&b$.^^
The fedayeen, translated men of saOTifice, ara also fighting
a^iainst the .Irab Governments.

I'hey owe no allegience to any

government and are responsible only to themselves. They view
any settlement other than their own as a betrayal or a disaster»^
So far they have prevented the /irab Governments from negotiating
with the Israeli Government.
Before 1956, most of the border violations were carried
out by unofficial, unorganized and rela-^r'-r ly non—violent
infiltrations of individuals and small groups. Often these
raids were a response to a specific v/rong such as loss of an
/Irab raider's land or the death of a family member at the hands
of the Israelis. Thus, the commando raid is not a new phenomena.
However, oommando organization is. Yet, the consnandos still do
not follow a typical guerilla Tsarfare pattern. Most targets are
not the military installations or public utilities. Rather they
are airplanes, buses and other nasans of conveyance, religious
shrines and geneMil large urban areas. The targets seem to be
chosen to meet two criteria»

to kill the maadLmum number of

^The Christian Science Monitor, Ifarch 5» 1970, p, 1,
^'•The Guerilla Threat," p. 30,
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people £md to provoke

anti-Israeli sentiment, both

locally E'-nd internationally.
The sense of Palestinian political coiaminity virhioh has
reemerged after two decades draws :zuoh of its cohesion fïrom
the common refugee experience of loss of land and of homeland*
This may be one reason vshj- today the conmando movemonts have
been able to develop a base %7i.th participation of all classes
of Palestinians, This broad base is in contrast to tho limited
resistance movements, both political and military, which have
ariseai since 1917*
Despite their differing opinions on the long-range objec
tives and the means to these goals, the ccmmndo groups aro
agreed in their rejection of the November "2, 196?, Security Coun
cil Resolution.^ In this rejection, they are supported by the
refugee population in general, which still calls for a set
tlement on tlie basis of the 1946 General Assembly Resolution,
whereas the refugees in 1955 were reported to be vzilling to
accept a separate state or to accept Arab-Jewish coexistence
in Israel, no Palestinian organization today has adopted these
goals, Bather, the Palestinians and the populations of the
Jirab States seam more bent cm driving out the Israelis or at
least subordinating the Jewish population to Arab rule*
Thou^ anti-Israeli feeling is still strong among the
Palestinians there are some recent signs of demoreillzatlon and
^"Issues Before the 24th General Assembly," International
Conciliation* Humber 574 (^eptembur, 1969), P* 16*
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sorao

impetus to the guei'illao, but it doos not sees to be

ennUf^ to draw tlio older refugees, I'ost of the recoatly cap
tured coKiDandos have baen young, new recruits* The veterans and
officers seem to have grorm wary of the deeper raids into
Israol,^^

Though the ideal of recovering

alestine is stronger tharx

ever, several reasons can be offered for this denoralization and
restraints
1. the lack of idsological underpinnings on what to do
once l'aiestine is liberated and
2. th^ disagreement among and within the groups on .joala
and tactics presently»
fha? the rival groups and factions also occasionally elaim
credit for the more spectacular forays indicates compétition
rather than cooperation.^ Nor do the groups appear able to
resolve their differencea satisfactorily with even the possibil
ity of an Arab—Israeli diplomatic settlement looming before then.
Jordan, the guerillas receive 10-15 dinars p&c n»nth
plus their keep. The Arab Legion soldiers get only three dinars,
(see Amn(Mi ihibenstein, ** 'Damn Everybody* Sums Up the Angry Mood
of Israel," The Hew York Times Magazine, li^bruary 9» 1969,
P. 96.)
^fhe bombing of the i^lahanek Yehuda marketplaoe in Jerusalem
was olaimed by two rivul gx'oups. The bombing killed 12 civilians
and wounded 53* xhe fedayeen council finally awsxded the honor
to A1 Fatah as it told the moat convincing Biary of the bombing,
Fatah also took credit for blasting the jpr&ge of formmr Israeli
Chief of Gtaff Itzhak Rabin. Later, it «as leaamed that he had
no garage. (See "The Guerilla Threat in the Middle ^st,*" p. i>3,)
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Summary
Pour main #i@rllla groups have taken on an istportant
positicm in the Palestinian cause during the 1960*8. The goal
of regaining the homeland of Palestine is oornown to all of thorn#
However, the means to aohieve this goal as veil as the structure
of a future Palestinian state differ among the groups* This
disagreanent ammg the Palestinians further ocHsplioates the
disagreement among the Arab Grovems^nts and between the Arabs
and the Israelis, and definitely has decreased the dimnoes of a
diplomatic settlement*
The present Palestinian militance has been developing for
some time, althou^ the present organization is nev compared
to the sporadic, unplanned forays a^inst

arael in previous

years. Adequate notice of Palestinian demands has also been
given. Many of the current Palestinian d^nands had earlier been
voiced in United Rations debates. The faotw whioh would have
been the most difficult to foresee is the commandât^' attacks,
both verbal and military, on the Arab host nations. Political
disagreements have existed between the Palestinians and the
Arab States, but the refugees sudden and unabetting disruption
in the host countries is more recent. The Arab Governments,
as well a.D Israel, have now become the alesti^ians' enemies.

cmprm v
rÂL^STOIiLKS iiiîD ISEAiL

In general the Palestinians look upon the Jovm and "Hie
State of Israel as intruders in the Middle i^t. The lailitanoe
of the oomaando groups, however, is more typical of the Pales
tinians living outside of Israel's borders. The Arabs living in
Israel and in the areas occupied by Israel during the 196?
«/ar, thou h they sympathize with commando goals, display an
entirely different relationship with Israel. This relationship
is presently one of cot^zistenoe, despite the discrimination to
which they are subjected. Thou^ the Israeli Arabs resent their
secondmolass citit nship status, they se@a more willing to accept
the Jewish regirm than any other groups of Palestinians. A study
of their current role and their potential role in the conflict
serve to show even more how complex the situation is and how mucdi
influence the Palestinians have in the chain of Middle ^iastem events,
Xriox* to 1967
The luru-wli Govei'ntient realized soon after the 194<^ w&r
that the xalestiiiiuns v-ould not be

turning en masse. It quickly

took £Jteps to v.nd .Lrab pi-opert^ omiership in order to set a
fiz-uu. base Tor the new country. In 1953 the Israeli parliament,
or iCnessut, x^assed the Land i-ciiuisiiiun Lew which stated that
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any persœi «âxo had fled his village and was absent «&en Israeli
forœs had entered the area autonatioally lost his land to the
Custodian of Absentee x^operty» iUiother Law, the Law of Eetrnm,
also disoriminated against the jr'alestinians* It stated that any
Jew ocMBing to Israel could olaici immediata citizenship by deolwiïghis intentions to settle; noiWews had to enduro a waiting
period#^ That these Israeli legal prooeduros wore detrimental
to the iiTabs who had lived in Israel or vriLshod to return, and
that they vr&ro oontrary to provisions of the United Nations
Partition Eesoluti<»i, whicdi stated that the Arabs in laraol should
2
not be s'ubjects of discrimination, has increased Palestinian and
Arab Government arguments against recognition of the atate of
Israel. However, Israeli officials have consistently maintained
that such actions are within the limits of a sovereign state
and that, as a mc bar of the United Nations, Israel is definitely
granted all of the ri^ts and privileges of a sovereign state*
This position has not made Israeli relationships witii the Pales
tinian iirabs, either inside or outside her borders, any easier*
The Israeli officials have maintained since 1^4^ that direct
relief by the U« H. was only a temporal^ measure. The works
projects, which have never tmterialiaed to any extent, have been
considered nwre important became they had Iwger^range implications.^
^GAQR. 22nd oession, L'ote by the uyrian delegate to the
Secretary-General (a/7173)» Agenda It«n 94» August 10, 1968.
'"General Assmably Resolution I6l(ll}, November 29, 1947»
-'Gfi.vlt. 5th oesaion, .là Koo -'oliticsi Committee, jpth Iloeting
(Sovember 7» 1950), p. 214.
i
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Th@gr were also better suited to aohieviag Israeli ez^« However, they have never provided a satisfaotory soluti<m beoaaise
of opposition by tiie Arab States and by the refugees. As
refugees living in Iwael do have oitizenship, relief and wxeks
projects in Israel have, for the most part, bema qarried on as
an inteomal matter without USEBIA assistance. % I95I, Israel's
Govœn&aent reported #at most of the tweadsinners, among tW
24,OCX) Arab refugees in Israel, imre gainfully employed. This
mmber, however, exoluded the white collar workers.^ fhe Goven*»
m«at felt that thtxae not yet employed ocmld easily be absorbed
by mrious works projects if they so desired.
Through 1952, the Agen<^ was providing for two types of
refugees in Israel. It iwovided for 17,000 Jews who had fled
the iirab States, all but 3,000 of vdicHn had bew resettlM. It
was also providing fm? 31,000 Arabs, 7,000 of vAwm had been
resettled.^ Tims, Israel was not so q^iok to welctme Arabs as
to weloome Jews, although the Govemmmit did take over the
maintenance of these refugees by the middle 1950's.
In addition to appropriating the lands of the Palestinians
who fled and not granting immediate citizenship to Arabs as to
Jem, the Israeli Govemmemt also au^iorized the acquisition of
land fnm Arabs living in Israel if it were needed for the «xgpansicm
5th Sessiw, Assistance to Palestine Refugees, Interim
Bepwt of the Director of the United Nations Belief and Works
Ageaicy tm Palmatixw Refugees in the Hear Bast (A/l4$l^ev. 1),
Suppléent Bumbw 19, p. 9#
P' 5-
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of a kibbutz or of private Jewish farm holdings. Much of this
property, as well as the property apia?ofa*iated from -Wie absmit
Palestinians, was in -Une bwder regions, a faot whioh made it
strategically significant. The Land Acquisition Law did provide
that compensation be paid for property acquired from Arab resi
dents of larael, but made no provisions for those Arabs living
outside of Israel. It also stipulated that the land taken from
Arab residents be necessary for "vital development, settlmient w
securitgr" during the period from May 4, 1949» to April 1, 1952.
Compesusaticm was to be paid in oash or an alternative pie<^ of
land was to be found if the owner bad be%i engaged in agriculture.
This Law was opposed at the time by the ilrab minority in the
Knesset» Yet it was at least a partial effort to appease those
who increasingly favored payment to all Palestinians for their
lost îxroperty»^
The United Hâtions estimated that the total abandoned
properly passed to Israel was 16,324 square kilometers* This
7
was valued at 100 million Israeli pounds. In addition, the
Israelis acquired some 20 millimi Israeli pounds wwth of move
able property left behind by the refugees.®
In addition to appropriating Arab property, Israeli officials
^Dom Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (Washington,
D. C., The Middle issuat Institute, 19^8), p. 183.
^GA(B. 6th Session, Progress leport of the United Hâtions
G<moiliation Camission for Palestine (a/1985)> supplement Number
18, p. 11.
^Ibid., p. 6.

have segregated, the Arab popilation into specific areas of the
country for "secwrity" reasons, They have alec restricted Arab
cAvements within Israel. Until the 196? June V,ar, the Israeli
Govemmant maintained ourfewB throughout all of the Arab areas*
isuch internal policies have done little to win -tixe allegiance of
the Arab population to the Israeli authorities* Thus, more and
nN)re iu^abs have left Israel all the time,
Eowever, 8<m8 of the mre moderate Israelis disputed these
means, most of Wiioh resulted from policies of former Prime
Minist^ Ben Gurioa. The more moderate elements felt, rather,
that such militant policies would only cause moT@ alienation,
instead of making the Arab residents into Ic^al oitizmis, Their
Q
opinions have been borne out by current situations. The Israeli
militance, as will be shown, seems to Mve lessened, raldiar than
increased, the «illingaes» of the Palestinians to seek a permanmit settlement with Israel.
Violence and harsh military policies have also bemi char
acteristic of Israeli policy totmrd the Palestinians. According
to a report by the United Hâtions Truce Supervisory Organisation
(UHTSO) Chief of Staff, an Israeli attack in the Gaga Strip <m
August 22, 1955» began the chain of violent which started the

10
subsequent organized fedayeen attacks on Isisel.
This military
^Pred J. Khouri, "The Poli<%r of Retaliation in A3«b—Israeli
Relatioma," The Middle fiast Journal. Volum 20 (Autmm, 1)66),
P» 437.
^°Ibid.. p. 440.
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retaliation has greatly escalated tensions in Israel aM in the
refugee oaoqps surrounding Imrael. Israeli officials olaim that
during the period of Egyptian belli^irwioy prior to the I956
Suez War, there «ere some 435 oases of armed fedayeen incursions
against Israel, nwrly 2,(XX) cases of armed robbery and 172
oases of sabotage perpetrated hy Idle Egyptian military wd feda—
yewi groups.^ Israel's military iras the first of the Middle
Eastezm states to develop a deliberate and of^cial policy of

12
retaliation to sucâx commando attach•
The Karf Qasim incident in 1956 is one eacaoBple of the direct
Israeli use of terror against its Arab po^ilati<m. The incident,
according to the Arab States, is typical of Israeli policy* Accord
ing to Israeli odMMcials, it is not. The Tillage of Eaf^ Qasim
lay about one-half mile Arom the Jcurdan border, inside of
Israel. Maay of the 1,500 villagers had gone to work the fields
in the axwning. Whèn they returned h%ae, they were rounded up
and told th^ had violated a ourfew imposed that morning vâiile
they had been working. Far a crime of %tl(A they imre ignorant,
they wwe shot. The Isx^eli Prime Ministw withheld ^e news
for scHse time until he had reported the incident to the îûoesset.
The Israeli Government announced that it was an acoidaat and
that compensation would be allotted to the surviving relatives.
The number slain has never been detei^mined exactly, but estimates
^^GAOB. 1st EMergenoy Special Sessicm,
Meotl;:^ ^November 1, 1956), p. 23.
"'^Khouri, CD. cit.. p. 436.

Plenary

Suoh inoidoitSy «he^er mla—
takes OT preplaimed, have not helped the Palestinians, OT -Uie
Arab oommunity, to view Israel as a peaoe-loviaag state.
Despite raider harsh Israeli retaliaticm policies, the
Government has not applied c^tinuous military pressurw in the
occupied areas. Onoe the Israeli military occupied the Gaza
Strip, Jordan and the other Ai#b States Imagined that the
indigenous Arabs and the refugees would be thrown out so that
Israel would have more space to acoosaoodate Zionist immigrants,^^
However, the U. M. Seoretary-General, in a note to the Genw^
Assembly in 1956, stated that, except for some groups of local
inhabitants taken out for q.uestioning, there was no evidence of
mass deportation of the Strip's inhabitants. He also noted that
migration between the Strip and Jordan was continuing as in the
past, despite proclamations forbidding this nmvement.^^ Thou^
the Arab States were concerned about Israeli e%pansi<m, this
eaqpansion se«Bed to be in line with the wifdies of certain of the
Palestinian oommxa&o groups iriio wanted to force Israel into
large-scale retaliation and the subsequent talœover of more
territory, just so that the territory was filled with Arabs*
Thus, the Palestinians would, they hoped, have an inside base
^^AQR. 11th Session, 630th Plenary Meeting (Deo^aber 1
, p. 785.
^^AOS. let Emeaegmc^ Special Sessiw, 562nd Plenary
,ng (Hovember 1, 1956), p. 14«

^^GAOE. 11th Session, Annexes, Agenda Itœa 66 (A/3491)»
December 3, 1956, p. 37.
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for their op^aticms. However, Israeli eoonoznio advanta^s to
the Palestinians in Israel have left this group not so prone to
resist as had been hoped. The Israeli military has also been
harsh <m any Arabs suspected of aiding the oommandos. Arabs'
houses have been destroyed and persons arrested simply <m suspioioa
of their having participated in guerilla warfare against Israel#
Ohanaes After the 1%7 War
Aft«r •Uie ISfSj War, the situation was drastiosCLly altered.
Israel had gained uncontested oontrol in the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip and the Sinai Pemlmmla and had beoo^ the largest
host country in the Middle East. Instead of being able to
criticize the Arab States fm? their inaction, Israel's Government
«as in tiie position of being the occupation power and of having
to deal with the refugees Wiether they remained in otxRipied
territory or moved into Incael proper. The Israeli Government
was ^so faced with the question of ;Aat to do with #e new
territorial acquisitions—annex them to Israel or leave than
opwi f(W bargaining. This question has yet to be resolv# and
is ottô of the worst points of dlsagremwnt betwe«m ^le Arab
Governments and Israel today. The Israeli Government's relations
with the Palestinians, both the Arab oitizew and the new refugees
of the 1967 conflict, changed drastically following the I967
War. As yet, mudk of this relationship is hinging on the ev«ntual disposition of the occupied territcwies.
Bather than make a decision as to how to solve the problem

-Tî^

#e refugee#, the Israeli Corexxmeitt ha» Wwa aotioa only
iSien aeoweary. Little in the way of lomg-teanm projects whldk
oould provide a final solution have been initiated. However,
Isx^eli officials have raaained very aware of the feeling of
the Palestinians and have taken minimal steps to oalm doim this
population whenever feelings begin to ra^.
The main fear of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel following
the 1967 War was that they would be out off from the remainder of
the Arab wcxrld* Israeli of^oials allag^ this fear by allowing
tpa&a ami traffio with Jordan Arom both tM Gasa Strip aiui the
West Mxùc» Israeli officials intended not to treat the Pales
tinians of the occupied twritories as a people apart, a mis
take lAitdi they felt had been mad^ by the irab States.Before
#e 1967 War, XJHSWA bad oared for approzimately 400,000 refugees
m i^e West Bank and 320,000

the Bast &mk. By July 2, 1967,

approximately 100,000 had fled from the West Bank to the Bast
Bank and to the Gasa Strip, many into existing UHBWÂ c*mps in
17
these areas.
Thou^ others left aftw this date, the total
numbws who fled by no n^ans reached the mimbers of those who
had fled in 1948# This would seem to signify that though the
Palestinians still carried a violent distaste for the Zionist
philosophies embodied in the State of Israel, they were no
^^"Israel and the vooupied Lands," New Statesman, April
15, 1968, p. 442.
^^The aoonomist. July 8, I967, p. IO3.
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-73mœe lifted. îhœre vwe no longer any nlgbt curfews except in
^e Gaaa Strip. Yet, despite leniency by the Israelis, growing
terrorist activities stagad from the Arab States have ignited
nationalist feelings mang the younger Arabs undw Israeli rule.
Occasionally protmzrorist slogans are found on houses. The
Az^b population beccmnes nervous whenever a bomb explodes and
20

usually avoids Jewish population centers for several days.

Since the 1^67 War, a few Palestinian leaders, both in
Israel and in the Arab States, have dared to sug^st that the
Palestinian people should make peace independently with Israel
to obtain territory for a new Palestinian nation. Moat, how
ever, still se«B to want revenge for their losses of proper-^
and years of exile more than Idiey want peace. Row successf^il
any peace settlement would be today is questionable as Israeli
officials still refuse to recognize the refugee population as
a political entity. And the refugee leaders claim mrnre fjad
more that there can be no peace without their participation.
Military Boles after 1#7
The Israeli military has developed a firmer strategy against
retaliation since the 1967 War. Shortly after the wfar, the
^erillajB tried to establish bases on the West Bank. The Israeli
military used helicopter and infantry search and destroy missions
to discourage such moves. The camps were moved ba(^ across the
Jordan iiiver and larger bases ware established there. The
20
iuonon Eubenstein, '* *Dami àhrerybody* Susm Up the Angty
Mood of Israel," TW Mm York Times Magazine. February 9, 1^9*
P» 98»

-7/1Israeli military continued .ushing tha groups, sending infan
try ioid planes across tha Hiver to eradicate the newly estab
lished bases. Current reports indicate that the bases have
been moved farther from the border and are smaller and much

less permanent•21
Also following tho 196? /ar, A1 Fatah announced that it
would transfer its headquarters to Israeli occupied territory.
This announcement failed to arouse the support of the millions

of Arabs in the occupied areas. The terrorist groups have
since found that they cannot trust the local population and
orders are given to avoid contacts with Arabs in the occupied
zones. However, despite this hesitanoe to #'ork directly against
Israel, the gone ilrabs still resent the Israeli presence, Most
of the Palestinians do not cooperate with the commandos because
they stand to 1O8É> more in the way of a modest economic boom,
a relative peace and a way of life more bearable than in a
refugee camp, Thay may also remember Arab terror of the 1936—
1939 period in which more ilrabs were killed than either Jews
22

or British.^

«hat is non-cooperation with the commandos has been expressed
as passive resistance when directed against the Israeli military
government. This passive resistance on the part of the Arab
population in the occupied areas has been met with a^^thy by the
Israeli occupiers, Israeli officials have taken the attitude that
21

"Make Them ^uakel" p, 40*
22
Rubenstain, op. oit,, p, 93,

if the Arab children in these tirea» did not go to school or if
their parents did not work it was their business, so long as
2%

they viere not militant.

Yet terrorist activities have continued from outside of
the occupied areas and Israeli officials have met these attacks
ivith force. Coranando attacks have brou^t several distinct
responses from the Israeli authorities and liie Jewish populace.
They have reduced to a minimm any Israeli willingaess to lose
military control of the v/est Bank. Thus, at least this portion
of the occupied territory is not negotiable under any settlement
PA
following the outline of the 1967 Securii^ Council Resolution.
Though it is impossible to measure accurately the physical
damage inflicted on Israel by the terrorists, it seems so far
to have been negligible,. Terrorist activities have, however,
introduced a daily tension into Israeli life, esj^ecially in
-Uie border regions, shelling across the Jordan Hiver is an
almost ni^tly affair. Heavy vreapons, including long-range
guns and bazooka are often used. Shelling and mine-laying ac
count for the great majority of the incidents.

Of a total of

1,288 incidents reported between June 12, 196?» aad December 31,
1968, only 157 were acts of terror and sabotage deep inside
Israeli territory,This would seem to ia&toate a certain
Israel and the Occupied Lands," p. 443.
^'tiubenstein, op, cit.. p. 27.
25lbld.
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loyalty among the Arab population in the border regions as
well as an effective Israeli defense system*
Â decline in the number of infi1trations and an increase
in shelling from safety across the border has been a noticeable

26

change in oommndo tactics since the June «j'ar.

The commandos

hare been able to cara^ out border incidents on almost a daily
basis, thou^, sinoe the subsqst of I968* Their activities have
been described as military pinpridoB, but they have had an
27
irritating psychological effect.
Yet, the border raids
affect the Arab more than the Jewish populations*

Border

kibbutz are well fwtlfled. Arab border settlements and camps
are not* Thus much of the damage is inflicted oa the allies and
not the enemies,
Socialigation of Israeli Arabs
Serious pressure has been put on the Israeli Government
by son» offloials to initiate a poli<%r of fait accmnpli in
the occupied territories az»i to establish Jewish settl^imnts
in -Uie «mes that would be considered to be annexed to Israel
28
no matter what a final settlement would twing.
Israel's
Bi^ty percent of the incidents are shellings across the
Jordan Elver* Taa p«ro«at are mine-layings alon^ the border and
only ten percent,are attempted inflltR&tlana. w®o fiubenstein,
ODroit.. p. 96.)
'Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movwwnt*
It# Significance in the Middle East Crisis," The ^Middle j^Ast
Journal. Volume 23 (Summer, I969), p. 293*
" ''
OH
"Viewpoints," Hew Outlook. January, 1969» p. 3*
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Government has begun this policy \vith its fortified kibbutz,

but 30 far these kibbutz ressemble more a temporary sailitazy
settlement than a permanent, peacetime village.
Yet the Israelis have tried not to alienate the lalestiniama
in the occupied arewi any more than absolutely necessary. They
have continued or attempted to restore the local àx&b adminis
trations. ilrab officials have been requested to continue their
functions under the supervision of military governors. Ma^r
have remainedI

some have quit In protest.^

Still Arab leaders in the expanded Israeli State have not
been invited to play an active role in the conception or exeouticm
of economic improv^ent or social rehabilitation. The military
authorities do not want Arab participation. And, though the
militaiy is not directly involved in future planning for the
area, its opinions are respected. Israeli officials have adopted
the attitude that it is too early in the planning for any Arab
participation, when the plami are completed, in accordance
with strictly Israeli views, and the Government is ready to
implement them, then Arab participation will be invited. Thus,
resettlement is not a cooperative venture, but an Israeli plan
51
imposed on the Arabs.
This lack of participation has caused
soma bitterness and could conceivably cauca an Israeli failur#
to integrate these areas in the future.
^%ee Appendix a.
^^on ieretz, "Israel's Administration and the i\rab Refugees,"
Foreign Affairs. Volume 46 (January, I968), p. 343.
%bid.. pp. 344-345.
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the Israeli Arabs béas invited to participate

in the present Government, mren in Departments v^oh directly
affeot the Arab populatiw. The situation in the Off±o@ of the
Prime Minister's advisor on /jpab Affairs is typical. Mo ilrabs
are employed. 0#er Depar-tei^ts follow the SEune pattmm, The
Ministry of Education is the wco@gti(m« ait, the jJirector of
ike kcnh Depar^nent in this Ministry is a Jew, and a S m %ho
32
does not speak Arabic.
Many teachers and intellectuals insist that the Israelis
are seeking to aipe oat a Palestinian national consciousness.
Israeli educators have asserted that education in the Arab wrld
has a fascist outlook «hioh has sought to militarise the Arab
youth.Thus Imrael has set about to reconstruct the educa^
tionsl i^stem in the occupied areas. Tœcts have been withdraim
from these areas until reviewed by Israeli authorities. As a
result, UMWÂ has had to c<^ile and distribute voluams of
teadiing notes acceptable to Israel.^
(Whaa the Israelis first sug^^sted changing texts and teach
ing methods, most of the Agency*s Palestinian teachers vent on
strike. However, the objectionable material was reraoved and
schools iK>w function normally with few official Israeli visits.
^Atallah Mansour, "Arab Intellectuals Hot Integrated," Hew
Outlook. June, I964, p. 27.
^^Persta, "Israel*s Administration," p. 342.
^^SAQS. 24th Session, fieport of the CcN^ssioner-Gmeral
of the United Nations Belief and .ïorks Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Bear Bast (A/76I4), Supplement Humber I4, p. 4*
^^"Israel aM the Occupied Lands,** p. 443.

•79Y&%f iKpaell officials' objections to textbook passais depre
catory to JemOf Zionism and Isaraal caused au upheaval in zwst
every subject and maiml^ in Ai-abio literature, history and
gBOgraghy. Educational friction was felt in both the Gaza
Strip «md on the West Bank. Hearl^- half of the standard text
books ware banned. Students and teachers boycotting the schools
caused some to be closed for several months.^
Since the stools are back to almost normal operations, the
Israelis instruct their Arab pupils in #ie history of the
Jewish National MWration Mov^ent, but devote little time to
the libaraticm movmmn# of the Arab people. The Ignorance (m
this mibject Ws forced Arab youth tb seàk these facts from
sources hostile to Israel and ov^r which Israeli authorities
Vf

Wve no convoi.

Only a small proportion of l^e Arab youth

graduatii^ from elm^tsry school enjoys further education. Even
the few who do graduate from secondary schools have had diffi
cult in finding jobs better than those available to youths
who have completed only elementary school.

Of all the problem,

education has possibly been the woi«t between the Palestinians
and the Israelis.
However, time has helped to change the educational system
to one someWkat more equitable for the Arabs. There are now
^^«reta, "Israel*s Administration," p. 343*
^^USahanmed Tatad, "Arab Youth in Israel—(Today and TcHaorrow,"
Hew Q
.964, p. 23.
jCtià# f p# 2%2

tnmnty Arab high schools in Israel. There was one in 1953»^^
Arab youth still lack activities after school hours. No clubs,
libraries or young peoples groups exist for the Arabs as for the
Jewish (diildren. At best, there are a few scout clubs #dL(di
hold meetings once a month.^
Mapam, an Israeli political paxi^, Ims attempted to help
the iirab youth* It founded the Arab Youth Pioneer zmvement, set
up producer cooperatives and published progressive Arab litera
ture. However, both its resources and effects are limited. It
has been compellM to cease its activities at times because of
so—called "administrative" intervention from the Giilitary ^yvemment.^
Althou^ Idle Israeli Govmmment has attempted to placate
its Arab population, pending some future settlement, it has
continuously refused to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian
culture. Sor has the Government tried to integrate the refugees
into Israeli national life,
Employment is another area of discrimination against the
Israeli Arabs. Jewish children leaving school join tiie Army for
two and one-half years. The Amgr provides them opportunities
to leam trades and continue their studies. (Moe free of Army
obligations, the Jews have virtually all doors of emplojwnt open
^^Mansour, op. cit.. p. 31.
^Abdul Asis Zu'bi, "The Discontent of Arab Youth," Hew
Qutloo^ January, 19^3, p. 14.
^bld.. p. 24.
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to thorn. The professional Jewish labor market is closed to Arab
youth* They are left with only the limited fields of eduoatiaa
and government clerkship*

Yet, most are not qualified to become

certified teachers which in turn accounts for the lower levels
of Arab educaticm* Hot are there many op wtunities available
in govenment. Of ^,000 government workers, some 300 are
Arabs. This is ap^woiimately 1^, The Arab population of
Israel, including the occupied areas, is now close to 50^
Kor are Palestinian and Israeli cultures compatible. The
Arab youth trtno has lived in the Israeli society brings back a
new way of life to the conservative and traditional village life,
which is still maintained in the Arab villages and refugee camps*
His ideas are often rejected by heads of families, ^ven if the
youth is economically free, he is still somewhat tied by Pales
tinian social traditiozm. Stxae of these youth have tried to es^
cape the problems of reconciling the two societies by illegally
crossing the border into the neighboring Arab States* Son® are
killed) others are caught and spend time in i\rab prisons, only
to be returned to Israel to spend more time in prison* However,
these youth have fouM that it is easier and cheapw to loam
a trade in an Israeli prison ^kan in an iorab village in Israel
The Arab Border Population
Another problem the Israelis have with the Arab bwder
^Ibld*. p. 15*
^\atad, OP. clt*. p. 24.

-82population is that many of these persons hare close faaily ties
wi-^x refugees in the Arab oountries. In many cases, the Israeli
i\r&bs are but ramants of extended families, wst of inhose mmk-

bors fled. Sentiments and sympathies of the Israeli Arabs are
olosely linked igith those of the refugees now living aoroas the
borders. This situation has created a deep-seated psyohologioal
problem of divided loyalty and eraotiwx.^ Israeli authorities
furthered this problem by prt^bitlng contacts between the :w<me
Arabs and their relatives and friends in Syria and Syrian parts
of occupied territory, liYhen the Arabs crossed the border
illegally, Israeli police sougjit to enforce the regulations and
violence resulted.^
The United Arab Republic complained to the U. H, SecretaryGeneral in Mardif I968, in cozmeotion with the atrocities against
the civilian pojailation by the Israeli military authorities.
Claims were made by the Arab States that the Israelis planned
to eradicate the refugee populations in Gaza and Sinai along
with the original inhabitants of these areas,^ A rejiort in
November, I967, showed that 100 to 300 persons a day, mostly fr<m
^Abd el Âsls Zu'bl, an Israell-«ÂrsU> d@g%i^ who belongs to
the left wing Mapam Party elaborated on this feeling in a state
ment to the 5ies#et. "We Israeli Arabs foiw an integral part of
the State of Israel. This is my belief and my desire. At the
same tla», we also are an integral part of the Palestinian people
in the occupied areas and in the Arab States ....(and) We find
ourselves in war between our state and our people," (See Tho
Christian Sdwme Mqaltor. Deweber 2, 1^9» P» 22.)
^^Rred J, Khmirl, "Friction and Conflict on the Israeli-Syrian
Front," The Mddle Bast jTcumal. Volume I7 (Winter-Spring, 1963),
p. 20.
'^GAOB, 22nd Session, Letter £rom lâie Representative of
United Arab Republic to the Seoretary-Gemral (a/7059)» March 1, i968.

-83the Gasa Strip wKPe Grossing into Jordan. Many stated that
they had been intimidated, shot at and had had their homes
4.7
damlished in attempts to fozwe than to move.
Israeli authorities, according to U. H. souroes, also p«Qr
10 Israeli pcmnds to mr&ry immber of a Gaza family which indi
cates a willingness to leave and ano#er 10 Israeli poundUi to
these families as they woes the Allmiby Bridge into East
AQ
Jordan. The Israelis also facilitate transportation.
The Arabs believe that the only danger to sewrity in the
Gaga Strip o<mes from the Israeli effort to persuade the refugee
to leave the Strip. A Hovembw, 1967, report states that 144
houses in Gaza refugee oaraps it&Te wlldoiK^d in a sin^e ni^t.
One Israeli official acknowledged privately tkat securil^ forces
were tougher in Gasa #an on the lest Bank. Rot only are housMi
desiapoyed, but also churches and hospitals. The imp<%ltion of
curfews is also rwMxrted to more oft«i in Gasa. (M January 19,
1968, the Israeli authorities imposed a general ourfev on more
than 200 Arabs in the occupied city of Gaea. Ho proper provisions
#mre made for the distributi(m of food and water during the
curfew.^^
Reports indicate that in February, I968, approximately
^^GAOa. 22nd ^essitm, Letter Arom the Representative of the
United Arab Republic to the Seeretary-General (A/7048), January 31,
1968.
^GAOR. 22nd Session, Letter from the Representative of J<xrdan to th!e Secretary^^neral (A/7I66), August 5» 1968.
'^^GAOR. 22nd Session, Letter Arom the Representative of the
UAB to the Secretary-General (A/7048)» January 31, I960.
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35,000 Arabs had been forced to flee Gaza for the East Bank. Cto
leaving the Israelis had forced the Arabs to sign statments
saying they were leaving voluntarily and relinguishing their rig&t
to return»

The Director of TJKl'^A noted in his report to the

24th General Assenbly that vlolenoe had become almost a omitinual
way of life in the Gaza Strip with strikes and vlolenoe <mrrled
out by the refugees and retaliatory violence by the Israeli mili
tary.^
The effects of the militanoe cultivated by the Egyptians
among the Strip*s population as well as the overcrowding in the
area have caused nore resentment against the Israeli occupation
than elsQfsdiere»

As a result of violence and no&-cooperatlon by

the refugees, Israeli occupation authorities have felt that more
stringent measures were necessary to maintain relative peace
in the Strip#
On the «Vest Bank, thou^ the refugees have been treated
more equitably than those in the Gaza Strip, the effects of
prolonged hostilities have been felt in a resistance to the
military occupation. As the time of occupation lengthened and
the prospects of a settlement decreased, demonstrations, strike
and bombings by the Palestinians became more frequent and led
to Israeli counterHcaeasures. One Israeli occupation colonel
^^GAOS. 22nd Session, Letter from the Hejaresentative of the
UAfi to the Se^etary-General (A/7099), May 17, 1968.
^^GAOH. 24th Session, Report of the Commissioner-General
of the United Bâtions Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
HefUgees in the Bear Bast (A/7614), Supplemmit Number 14, p. 4*

-35HOB blamed, the troubles ON just a BXHSLLI percent of the popu

lation. He stated that "It's the ^ of tha townspeople, the
inteUegentsia is who cause the trouble*

They seem to see

the fact of military defeat m a defeat fw all their past, their
great poets and philoso^ers—If indeed they had any* I don* t
KO

know.M"^

It has been this sac# group which the Israeli author

ities have been unable to provide employment*

Cimbined %ith the

Israeli attitude of ignori% the Palestinians past, the West
Bank Palestinians have come to feel the same rejecticm from
the Israelis as txom the Arabs. The Arab Governments have just
been more direct in their rejection of the l'aiestinians by not
granting oitiaienship and by looviding hardly any em^jloyment.
The probles» the Israeli authorities hava faced in dealing
with the Palestinians in the occupied territories are not only
more numerous, but more complex, than those ever faced in
dealing with their Arab residents before 1967» For the Arabs in
Israel, including those in the occupied semes, now total almost
R-S
one-half of the po£ailation.
Given the present rates of popu
lation growth, and a stable Jewish po*%lation, the Jews would
bewme a miQWity in a decade in a Greater Israel including the
the West

and the Gaza Strip*

^ince the ôix Jay .Var, there

have been increasing requests by officials and citizens for more
^•Israel and the Occupied Lands," p. 442*
A-'eretz, "Israel's Hew Arab Dilemma," The Middle ^^ast
Journal, Volume 22 (./inter, 1968), p. 49*
^4bid.* p. 51*
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Jewish Imnlgratlon to balance the larger Arab population,
S<Mse Palestinian /.rabs are passively resisting the Israeli
administrât!on. Others are participating in various ftxrms of
cooperation from quietly carrying on normal official functions
to discussing the possibilities of a political solution with
the Israelis. Few, if any, of the occupation Arabs favor
integration as a minority into a Jewish State or mass emigration
to mare luw&tive areas of employment. However, even the most
moderate Palestinian leaders in Israel are xmisilling to take
55
any public stand without backing from /irab loaders abroad.

Soon after the occupation, Israeli planners were amre that
the refugee problem could not be solved outside the context of
overall economic and political planning for the

est Bank and

Gaza. Pilot projects for refugee integration included plans
to change wop patterns, to utilise the Jordan Hiver •waters more
adequately and to market produce in Israel and abroad. The
problem of settling the refugees is that the only land available
is in the Jordan Valley which is unbearably hot in the summer.
Also, many of the younger refugees are tovmspeople and not
inclined to work the land. The Israelis have found that they
cannot dump the iui-abs into cooperative farming as they have the
Jews. Like tho Palestinians, the Israelis are divided on how
any solution should procédé. Four main schools of Israeli
thou^t have emerged;

1, Intransigent—urges refusal to resolve the refugee
problem until the Arabs agree to disousa a genmral
peace. This group points out that Jordan milked the
ii&mt Bask, and ^gypt turned Gaza into a ggketto.
2, the passive—as normal life returns to the area, they
feel that the progress in Israel wlH filter through
to the refugees» The effects should be watched be
fore now pmgpmm are introduced,
3» the evolutionary—Idle Israelis would improve the way
Arab» feel toward
They should raise the Arab
standard of living and promote Arab-Jewish integration.
4. the Utopia»—«this group has left-^sring support and
believes the field is open for ikrab-Jewish inte^ation
at present.^
The military governmemt in the occupied areas has its own
goals, which are hi#ly respected hy Israeli officials. It plans
to interfere as little a# possible with the daily life of the
Arabs, giving th@m mazimm frwdom so they will act as a sort
of bridgehem# betwe^ Israel and the other Arab States. It also
intends to surpress terrorisas irith an iron hand when it appears
Though Israeli occupation has brought certain eo^Kwmio
advantages to tilae refugees, it has also created problem. The
problems have been especially related to Israel's firm deteridnation to obtain 4e facto control of all of the occupied areas,
despite UHSWâ, the refugees or the Arab States. This policy
of ti^tening a hold

these areas, for security reasons ostenm

sibly, has not helped Palestinian-Israeli relations. For one
thing, such a policy contradicts Palestinian ^JBIB on the dispo
sition of these areas. It also makes the 1alestinians and the
Arab Governments more defensive, more militant and more deteiœined
^The ^oonomist. July 8, 19^7, p, ICffi.
Israel and the Occupied Lands," p. 442#

not to allow Israal'a military any further expansion.
More them actual _^hysioal dlamago, terrorist activities
have hurt Israel in tarns of defense expand!tixToS# They are
adding to tho already large burden of maintaining out-ofproportion regular foroes and have forced the Government to
spend millions of dollars on the fortification of the cease
fire lines. The Israeli defense budget of one billion U. u.
dollars for I369 was 35?^ of the total Israeli budget and
of the
Summazar
l^ior to the 1967 »v'ar, the Israeli Government made sporadic
attempts to inte^ate its minimal Arab population,

irabs in

Israel ware granted oitiaenship, wej^e found jobs and were
c^pensated for lost propœrty. Yet, they wore not given status
equal to the Jewish poinilatlcm. The jobs they held and the edu—
oatioa 'Uiey reoeived wore not equivalent to those of the Jewish
populatlcm.
Following the 1^7 War, Israel beoame the largest host
country.

With the influx of refugees, Israel doubled its terri

tory, although only the "old oity" of Jeruslamn has been officially
annexed as yet. Though the Government does not plan to evict
these refugees, neither has it taken conta?eto, definitive steps
to integrate them.

Though Israeli officials recognise that the return of
^^Eubenstflnia, op. oit., p. 27.
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nomml life is inseparable fr<m a soluti<m of the refugee
problem», they laok a définitire program to accomplish a re
turn to normal, normal is not clearly defined, nor is it
agreed cm by the Israelis or the Palestinians. The Israelis did
atrive to resume trade, and to a lesser extent traval, between
the two banks of the Jordan Hirer and somewhat between Jordan
and l&e Gaza Strip. However, both Jordan and Israel have
eoonwnio and political reasons for favoring such policies, des
pite the existence of the refugees. Israel's surplus of agri—
miltural product» nomally g^es to Saudi Arabia and lûxn&it»
Without these markets, this ^oroduce would have to be absorbed
in Israel. This would bring a fall in prices* Politically,
Israeli officials hope that if the population of the occupied
areas maintains somewhat normal

tacts, it will be less restive*

Jordan has been reluctant to close off her prime source of
agricultural produce and feels that shutting off the West Bank
might enhance a latmit tendency among the refugees for selfdetermination.
Israel's economic prosperity and demand for manpower hare
made it easier to integrate the refugees than in the Arab States*
Mudh has been done to solve ^e unemploymmit problem among the
general refugee population. However, success in solving the
problems of the workers has accentuated the problem of unma*
ployment of the intellectuals. Most agree this problem is one
of the main causes of bitterness.
As the refugees are conowitrated in the border areas, their

«90lirss are made more difficult by the Increasing numbmrs of
border incidents. Most refugees in Israel no longer fear tile
Israeli occupiers, though generally thej still dislike the
Jews. The refugees do seem to appreciate their situation better
than life in a refugee camp, or possibly even that of living ia
one of the iirab States, yet they are far from being totally
integrated into Israeli society, or of even being agreeable to ik9
idea* As the Israelis c^mot agree to a Palestinian dominated
socie*^, little (xmcrete has resulted. Israeli—Palestinian
relations do semn to be nwre amiable than Arab

tate-iPalestinian

relations, a fact vdiich does show son^ sort of Israeli progress.
However, until the Israelis agree to work with the Palestinians
to develop concrete plans for the future of the occupied areas
and of idle refugees as umll as agree to discuss outstanding
political differences and goals, it would se^ that the present
situation will continue or deteriorate further.

GHAx-T3it VI
THJ

.J® TH^ AiUB STAI'^

between 1S4Ô and tUa June 1967 «ar, four iirab Govoms^ato
were hoata to the majori^ of the Palestiniari refuses

In

1961 the Àgenoy Director noted that the host countries and
their govemmmitm have shown a deep understanding of the refu»
gees' problcias and sjnapathize with their neWa.

By 196?

much of this s^sipathy and understanding had disappeared*
general jirab Attitudes
.ihether out of syiapath;^ for and agee^nent with the
refugees or whether for their ovm advano^ent, the host ooiaitries
have mewle the job of UHEiA more difficult than absolutely
necessary by some of their policies toward the Aganoy* uro
grams auoh ae the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley rrojeot and the 3inai
Desert xrojeot, both designed to provide more water for the
area thus providing more farmland, have not met with any
success. They have been opposed by the refugees and by the
Arab states and have been successfully blooimd by the Arab
^GAOR« 7th Session, Annual fieport of the Director of the
United Hâtions liolief and norks Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (A/217I), Supplement Number 13» P« 2.
^GAQE. I6th k^ession, Annual fieport of the Director of the
United Hâtions Belief and 7/orks Agency for Palestine Eefugees in
the Hear Kast (A/486I), Supplwient Kimber 14# p. 4*
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The host goremmente have sought to exploit the Agency
by requesting purchases of relief supplies locally rather than
elsewhere even thou^ local prices may be hij^er,'^ Close Agwoy
consultation with private employers in the area has, however,
enabled vocational training courses to be adjusted to potential
employers' requirements. This has opened laora opportunities for
Agency technical graduates, and more and more are being recaruitod
5
in the nei^boring Arab countries. However, the Arab hosts,
by virtue of their vote in the United Nations, do curtail
programs which they do not deem politically desireable, Thouggi
the kfs&xusy has had some successes, there are still too fern
jobs in the area for all of the refugees and even for all of
the indigenous populations. This will continue unless mxc&
(xmiwehensive development measure# are taken. Such measures caivnot be implemented without the agreement of the refugees and of
the host governments.
In all the Middle Eastern area, including Israel, the
refugees can afford to work for lower «ages as they are aided
in their subsistenoy by UBBWA. This wmpetition makes the

^GAOfi, 12th session, jjinuiil Report of the Jireotor oi' the
United Nations Relief and Works Agenay for Palestine EefUgees In
the Sear ^ast
Uupplwment Kumber 14, p. 24.
^AOR. 9th Session, Annual Report of the director of the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refuses in
the Near 3ast (A/2717), Supplement Htimbor 17, p* 30.
^gAQB* 21st Session, Report of the Ocmnissioner-General of
the United llations Relief and orks ^igericy for Palestine liei'ugecw
in the Near East (A/6313), Suppleimnt Number 13, p. 2?.
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refugees uzwelxxme in the host couni^ies and tends to de
gress the already low wags ratesThe situation hampers the
overall development of the aroa, but still the iix-ao hosts
do not ohoose to terminate UKIiî/A* s presence and undertake a
aoluticai on their ovai. This v/ould lose them a political bargain
ing advantage as the problem per se would soon have to be
eradicated. The hosts, rather, have chosen to keep the refugees
in restricted areas, Such aas the case in -.gypt where the re
fugees were contained mostly in the Gaaa Strip. Syria ima
refused to accept any more, Lebanon restricts them severely,
Jordan alone has granted citizenship, and has evidenced a slight
willingness to investigate means of making the refugee citizens
7

self-supporting,

Even so, laost of the refugees in Jordan were

contained on the ^est and now the East Banks,
Though the refugees wwe initially welcomed in the Arab
States, it was not long before their continued immigration turned
this w@lo(«%^ into resentment, The mmber of refugees in the
oangps has risen steadily each year, partly from nato^al increase
and partly from in-migration Axm other places in the host
states to the ^mps as family fUads have run out, A few refugees
are new arrivals from Israel; mmre are refugees #10 were evicted
from local Arab villages for cutting fruit trees for firewood
or performing other destructive acts. Others are simply looking
^Sydney Hettleton Fisher, ed., Jocial l'orcas in the m iddle
aast (l#aoa. New Ywk, Cornell University Press, 1955)» P# 248.
7lbid.. p. 242.

-94for a more familiar and. satisf^ying social environment and
hoping to find it in the camp situation,^
The refugees pose an internal econociic, socle.! and poli
tical prcblea for the host governments vi/hich in part account»
fox many of the restrictions on them. The two and ono—half
million refugees probably have the highest levvl of education
g
of any groups of Arabs in the area. This too can account for
some of the feeling a^inst them. This education is oriented
toward Palestine—the schoolrooms, scout groups, sport teams and
other organized activities are given the names of Palestinian
towns, herOS, martyrs and villages. The schools are often
decorated with Palestinian picturesThus the direction of
refugee education does not provide for the refugees* Integration
into the Arab host states any more than into Israel.
This Palestinian socialization has not helped in bringing
peace to the area, Negotiations over tho years have failed
largely because the governments and the refugees are determined
to retain their last advantage given by their exile. This posi
tion is not particularly realistic, but rather emotional. Yet
it has so far led to three wars. The current organized Pales
tinian raids, and Israeli reprisals, have only served to intensify
6th session, Report of the virector of the United
Nations Belief and ..orks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Bear -.ast (l/lgO^), supplement Number 16, p. 4,
^Donald Grant, "After f:mplres—(hat?" Vista. July-Au^ist,

1969, P. 45.
10
A, L, Titawi, "Visions of xieturnj The ^alestino Ai-ab
Refugees in Arabic Poetiy and Art," The Middle East Journal.
Volufiie 17 (autumn, 1963), P. ^23.

-95Arab—Israeli tensions*
That the military escalation will stop is doubtful. IJo
refugees, including those who have obtainsd a levol of living
greater or equal to that held boforo their azile, appear able
to accept the status quo ivith anything better than a profound
feeling of bitterness, hatrod and unrest. According to a former
Palestinian who spent years teaching in refugee camps, most
of the refugees, in the early 1960's, would have returned to
their old homes if allowed, Thay did not feel welcome in the
Arab States. Many will not agree to resettlement for this
reason as well as the fact that thsy would probably lose their
claims to lands in Palestine.
CoEsnando raids on Israel have brought increasing misery
to those states housing the refugees. Prom the end of the
binai war in 1956 until the beginning of I965, Israel used aimed
reprisals against only iiyria# In early 1965» the Israeli-Jordan
ian demarcation lines suddenly became critical, largely because
of the activities of Al Fatah* Since this time, Israeli troops
have also retaliated against Lebanon and iiigypt as a result of
12
oocmando raids staged from these territories*
% 1969» if the Palestine ^erillas had not existed, the
area would have been virtually at peace, iùccept for some iaoi—
dents along the Suez Canal, all of the major Israeli retaliations

11"Inside the ..rab Oainps," The Christian Century, Tay 11,
I960, p. 567.
IP
i'red J * Khouri, "The Policy of Retaliation in ^a-abIsraeli Relations," The Middle East Journal. Volume 20
(Autumn, 1966), p. 448.

-96v&r@ provoked by the guerillsws,^^ Israeli military retaliation
has become more harsh to try to discourage guerilla raids. The
_rab states, ./hich hc-vs felt the force of those Israeli attacks,
have had to increase their Kiilitary strength in order to pro
tect themselves, from both the Israeli attacics and £roni the
x-alestinians«

Thus, all three grouijs have become increasingly

better armed»
The changes in the political and social structure of the
refugee consnunity during its prolonged exile, together with
the encouragement ixrovided by the Arab atates, have bz-ou^t
about til J Qoizmiando movements. The Palestinians, through the
commandos, have recently gained status as a separate entity
in the Middle East, at least on the part of the Arab Governments.
These Governments, attempting to strike a balance between support
of the ooQBnandos md restrictions on them have often found
themselves unable to act decisively in a situation of confron
tation. For the Palestinians are by now as well armed as the
host governments. Thus, the host governments have hesitated
to back the conmandos and particularly Al Fatah. This group
they feel is too extremist and could eventually involve them in
an undesired war with IsraelThis feeling has persisted more
strongly since the June ï/ar and seems directly related to in
creased cossnando activities.
^^'iiow to Jireak the Jrust Barrier," j)lev/sweek, January ZO,
1969, p. 38.
^^Khouri, "The jc oliqy of Hetaliation," p. 448.

-97Prom tha viewpoint of the fodayeaa, their greatest suooess
has been that they have deterred Israel and the Arab States fr(m
negotiating a peaceful settlement of the conflict, zhren if the
Arab Governments were seriously seeking to make peace, such a
peace is now almost worthless to the terrorists and to the
15
Palestinian masses.

Following the 1967 .»'ar, the Governments in both Lebanon
sjid Jordan found it neoessfiory to devote mre and more time to
internal rather than regional troubles. Rioting and government
crises, directly attributable to the refugees, have pla^iod both.
The Palestinian or^uiizations have attained a degree of uolitical
legitimacy and popularity through the /irab masses, whether
consjrvative or radical. However, the Palestinians' idea of
nationalism is opposed in varying degrees by the host governments.
Though the ralestine issue is the isain thread holding the
iirab Unity Movement toother, it seems unlikely that the rales—
tinians would relinguish their new identity to a united Arab
world. Thus, it seems ironic that while the Palestinian causa
and the

defeat of Israel are the main points of agreement ia

i-rab Unity, the Palestinians are not and do not care to become
an integral part of a united ilrab movement
Thou^ the Arabs and the Israelis seem more anxious to find
a solution than ever before, their desires are now negated by
the Palestinians wish to prolong the conflict until Israel is
^^Aîïînon Rubenstein, " 'Damn liverybody' Sums Up the Angry
Mood of Israel," The Mew York Times Magazine. February
1969,

P. 93.
Grant, OP. dt». p. 48.

eradicated. ?ha I967 Security Council Seaolution outlining a
solution was purposefully vague iind therefore acceptable to all
parties. In the spring of 1968, Jordan and Jgypt agreed to
its implementation, Israeli officials later indicated accep
tance, However, the States' interpretations of the Resolution
did differ. Despite the unprecedented governmental agreenent,
the

Palestinians, backed by the Syrian Governnent, have declared

that the Resolution is oorpletoly unacceptable to them. Thus,
it has remained unimplemented and largely undiscussed.17
Jordanian-Palestinian Relations
In Jordan, possibly more than any other host country, the
Palestinians have had a noticeable effect on the political,
economic and social situations. The present Palestinian leader
ship has attained status in Jordanian government circles by
serving the interests of the Kashomite throne. Kov/ever, this
is a double standard on the part of the i alestinians %?ho have
little liking for the monarchy, ikn autonomous Palestinian
State, v'/hich they prefer, would necessitate an end to the pre—
18
sent Jordanian Government.
Following the I948 defeat, the Jordanian Government did all
that it could to stifle the xalestinians' feelings of indépendance»
Though still not having a working relationship with the Pales
tinians, th. Jordanian officials, as a result of the Israeli
17
Mchael Adams, "The Search for a Settlement in the Lliddlà ::^t.
The Political .uajterly, Volume 39 (October—December, 1963), p.
^ Joseph Sasri îïasr, "Palestinians Want a New ^lite," Net:
Outlook. February, 1969» p. 38.
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have boon relieved of part of

their problem v/ith the rofugaus. Israeli officials are now
forced to try to s\ar^-ress this fouling of Palestinian nationalism
aioeng this group.
The refugees in Jordan v/ex*e welcomed at first. Uiaall irri
gation projects vfere begun to pro'/ido land for rosettlanient. The
professionals aiaong the refugees vmre fitted into the expanding
Jordanian Government and welfare services. Throe booano members
of the Cabinet* ^arly in 1950 a law was passed j^^rovidin^ for
the assignment of state lands to the refugees for homes and
farms,^^ Some 5^7,000 refugees wont to Jordan and comprised
over ono-4i&lf of the population at thu end of the 19h^ »ar»
'fhou^ a numerical liiajority of the Jordanian population,
the refugees, ev«n though thoy. have full votin^; z'ights and
citizenship, are treated more as a political minority. They
do have a role in the Groverœient, but it is by no means repre
sentative of their actual numbej.s. The Jordanian authorities, too,
realized that their only hope of ever winning the refugees lay
in developing an econotny which would absorb them, more than
a little has been adtiieved, much of it due to the Govenment'a
20
cooperation .vith UNH#/A*

UKRV/A has been Jordan's bluest enterprise. It spends more
^^Georg'ianna G. Jtevens, "Arab Hefugeas: 1948—1952,"
L'iddle -.ast Journal. Volume 6 (Sucmer, 1952), p. 286,
2Û

"VieviQJoints," Kew Outlook. January, 1969, p. 5*

The

-100money than the- antire civil budget of the national government.
As a result the more than ^00,000 refugees have a hi^or level
of living and education than most of the natives» 21
..'ork opportunities have remained eSi-ecially scarce in
Jordan, However, the . gency still has been laore successful with
resettlenent projects in Jordan than in any other host state»
LB of February, 1957» the Agency had completed seven resettlement

projects which provided for 302 refugee families. Projects
planned and underway as of that date would resettle another
105 families. Yet, the number resettled is still less than
22

the net increase of the refugee population.

The individual grants program in Jordan has been one of the
most successful mjans of helping the refugees to become selfsupporting, .('hen the prolan Viras first proposed in 1954» niuch
of the refugee population was against it as they feared it would
prejudice their ri^t to return to their homes. The beginning
of the program v/as delayed several tionths. Once begun, the pro
gram still encountered considerable opposition from the refugees
23
and iuS outcome was in doubt»
However, by I964» soae

refugee families had achieved self-support through the project*
Jven »/ith the positive attitudes toward the refugees, the
21

3en H» liagdikian, "Tra(;edy of ilati-od," The xieporter»
November 1, 1956, p, 33#
22
"Developments of the _;uarter: Comment and Chronology,"
The Lliddle i^ast Journal, Volume 11 (Spring, 1957)» P» I63.
" ' '2^
giiOK, 13th session, /mnual Report of the iJirector of the
United Hâtions iîolief and works ..gency for Palestine Hefugeos ju*
the Hear ^ast (-^/3931)» Supplement Number 14# p. 6.

•101Jordanian Governtient ./as oxjjerioncine a nogu,-ii\ra ros^.onse.
1957» tho Ldddla

Xa

Journal ^lated that ioaaan ans laxgoly a

«alestino city ti*i.asferrod in Si>ao8.^^ -ieforo the 19i^ ar, lining
ilussein li-'as attumj/ting to minlmiae aliénation a;aoi%' th0 i'alôotinianu* Hu minglad vd.tli tho rofugeoG ite^uantlyj his laoepti^m
was gOiiorall^ warn and 3i.ontanuous«

However, this i-eoeption

SQujaod to reflect jaor« on Hussaiii personally than on hia office
or his politios*^^ 3y I960, the Jardaoion Government mews oon»
siderine asking the itxab league to help it curtail r^xugee mill—
26

tanoe*

^

I966, the PLÛ vme premmiring Hu&aein to

declare Jeruealawa an "Arab Ci^' and to make it the capital of
Jordan* Hussein refused, thus antagonizing xLO leaders
The refuses' idea of an independent .^lestinian homeland
was partially revived by Hussein's comment that he had no
objection to tho creation of an autonomws state on the .est
Ikmk if it would help to pr(x%M)te a peaceful settl^aent of the
.Irab-Israeli dispute#

The statement vas later denied, but

it had dcme its damage. It encouraged stme xalestiniaas to tWœ
a more independent stance from the policies of Amaan, The
Israelis, who favwed the ides, encouraged it by subsidizing
28
cme Arabic newspaper which had favored the plan#
However,
^'^«iievelopm.ojits of the v#arter," p# I64»
^^The i>o<moEdBt. September 5, 1959» P* 741#
^^Midi^e tàaat 2ress Uevi&w, Volume 9 (Sew York, ihoanlola
i-ress, I960}, p. 7#
^^jf'red J* Khouri, The Ara^Israeli Dilwmia (ayraouee, îi# Y.,
Syracuse University iress, I9W), p# 112#
qp# cit.. p. 39.

as tho oonii;4i.ndo groups lu.ve grovm in strength and as thoy have
encouraged the idea of liberatin^j l alestino, the formation of
a separate .. al&stinian state has lowt nuch of its intrigue.
jJcK.dte liu£3sein's lack of con trol on coiamundo operations
and his loss than atiiablc relatione v/ith the ^ al^stinians in
general, a sixty laeauor .urliaaient was elected on ..pril I5,
11^67» .vhioh did support the Iling, .^hiikairy, then heading the
iI/0, had called for a boycott of the oleotion, but his wishes
2Q

were not .vidoly followed. "

.ilthough such results indicate support for thw Iling, the
xalestinians have lon^^ ard consistently called for political
parties «/ith platforms and an end to the Jordanian system sub
jecting rarliameiit and the

to the will of the King#

The

Palestinians have no loyalty to the monarchy and neither intel
lectual, emotional nor ideologioal attachment to it,^^
In 1967» at the same time as Jordan lost over one—third of
its productive territory, the otate acquired between 150,000
and 200,000 «est i3ank P alestinians, Nearly half of these persons
were refugees for the second time.^^ iaost became non-productive
refugees on the iiJast Bank, Hesponaible Jordanians would like to
see the refugees retmned to Israel, Confusion exists among the
refugees, althought at one Jordanian government camp »'/hich receive#
29
•^J. H. Huiainga, "The Palestine xiefugeesi .erennial Source
of 'Trouble, The i:ie;jorter. May 18, I967, p, 3!>«
^Pjohn B. .,olf, "The /irab liafugoe i-roblem," Current History.
jJocerabor, 1967, p. 357,
PeretB, "Israel's Administration and Arab Hefugees,"
Foreiaa Affaira. Volume 46 (January, 1968), p. 337•

-103many of the refugees in 196?, nearly all said they vfonted to
return to their previous residence• This enthusiasm dimied
?Aen they were reminded that this also meant returning to
Israeli rule.^ In July, 1968, the Jordanian Government pro
hibited the entry of all persons intending to remain in East
Jordan. There has since been almost no legal mi@rati(m to
this area from either the n'est Bank or Gaza Strip*
The oonsnando activities in Jordan inareased lollovdLng the
Six Day Jar. They signalled the dam of a new political era
in viMch few doubt the commandos* ability to oust the imnarchy
when they are ready,^ However, it would be a mistake to
think of the Resent cwomandos as a continuation of the commandos
earlier sponsored by the UAE and led by Shukaixy. The present
group is more bitter and more determined, having suffered three
military defeats and some, the third dislocation. Their ewtions
are more spontaneous and deliberate and do not need impetus from
J^gyP't or from Syria,
More and more the Jordanian Govemmaat has been at odds with
the Palestinians. The commando leaders wanted to be allowed to
mobilize the Palestinians in Jordan, to organize military train
ing, to impose taxes for their support and to fortify border
villa^s. To Hussein, this would be tantamount to relinquishing
Jordanian sovereignty over the Western part of the country,
^^he jjoonomlst. July 8, 196?» P* 103.
%bld.. p. 108.
^asr, op. cit.. p. 40.
^^Ibid,

-104Hussein, rather, explained, this attitude in l%^ following the
.Jar«

He wanted the conaaandoc only to bo proof that a falostiniaa

uaoyle was alive and supported by the iarab nations, until sudi
time SB tho v/orld's conscience awoke and gavs the j/alestinians
the right of self—determination,^
iiost of the Palestinians in Jordan still support Nasser
; nd his idea of nationalism»

Yet his control over then is no

longer so strong as it once was. Their enormous political power
is directed against Hussein whose pro-,est orientation they
re#rd as unfti^dly to their goals. In Aanan and Jamasws, the
refugees can be found squabbling for every scarce job opening
with the natives. Their presence wei^is on the econondc, social
and political structure of not just Jordrji, but of every Arab
•itate in which they reside.
On the question of #her@ and in ^s3iat numbers the fedayeen
should be allowed to operate in Jordan, Hussein ulticiately backed
down and gave them virtually a free hand in the border areas by
the end of 1969#

This was contrary to the expectations of

majo^ who had felt sure that he wtmld curtail fedayeen activities*
However, the weakness of Eusseiil* ^ position was shown as early
as Hovmber, 1968, lAen loyal Bedouin soldiers clamped a curfew
on kmaxi and rounded up members of ICataeh al Masr (i'halanx of
Victory), a secretive, fringe group of fedayeen* ./h«û these
E, Jhlomo, "The Real ^lesiatance," Hew Outlook, January,
1969, p. 3.
Lebanon*
1969, p. 30.

Along the i^rafat Trail," Time. Movm&ber 7,

-105Bédouins also attacked a Fatah training camp, killing nine
men, i^taà leader# alerted 7»000 armed fedayeen to stand ready
to move against Amman. 7hou^ Hussein and the fadayeen had
an angry meeting in Amman where Hussein declared, "If I don't
rule this oountzy, then X shall bwm it," he was forced to
reconsider when the fedayeen rmninded him that the popilation
of Auman, now 4^»000, had been 35»000 in 1$58 and they vmce
still able to reduce it to this sisie.
At the same time Sheik ilkif al—Faiz, Minister of Coimaeroe
and loader of the largest Bedouin tribe threatened to withdraw hi#
support from the Government if Hussein continued to use his
loyal Bedouin troops against the fedayeen. Hussein, also under
pressure from laudi Arabia which subsidizes -Uie Jordanian eoowMggr,
ïwomised to lift the curfew he had imposed to control the fedayeen
and to allow them to keep their arms if they would keep axm&é
men off of the streets of
Lebanon, Syria and Egypt have fared little better in their
deaL'J^igs with the 1 alestinians, althou^ none has grants citi
zenship to their refugees or displ^ed as positive an attitude
as the Jordanian Government has. ^ven so, they have much the
same problems as Jordan. Such refugee actions seem to support
the owtentions that they do not want to be integrated into the
Arab countries, nor do they regard thu iirabs as complete allies*
^"Jordan," Time. Hovember 22, 1963, p. 30.
P* 35.

-106Hgyptisja-Paleatinlan Selatlona
Egyptian political power in the Middle ^&st has given
Hasaer more influence with the Palestinians than any other
gorsmaent has. However, the iiigyptiaaa Government has ner&r
wanted to assume responsibility for the refugees, as is
evidenced by its allowing only a few into Ijgypt proper#
Of Egypt's refugees, more than 9^^ were channeled into the
Gaza Strip after 1948 and not permitted to leave»

This area

was never incorporated by Egypt, but retained the frame of
law and £4iriinistration which existed lAen it was part of the
British Mandate»

Local Palestinien laws r%mined in force

3jad many of the same officials retained their posts.^ This
was one Egyptian method of keeping alive a Palestinian idœitity.
Judging from Israeli ^oblems with and approaches toward the
Gaza refut,--^ - ai opposed to those on the west Bank, Egypt's
success was fairly high. The only proposed project, during
tho years of Egyptian administr. tion to solve even part of the
problem, was to ^-'u.Ap water from the Suez Canal to irrigate the
land. Ho one ever determined vi^ther the water was suitable,
and the Egyptiaji Government refused to consider the project
seriously until the Aswan Dam was constructed. Even such a
project, had it been completed, was calculated to settle only
^^Pereta, "Israel's Administration," p. 337#

-107<me-tmrd of the strip'»
Mar did the i^gjrptiaa Goverwmit enoourage self-support
projects or movement out of the area. Rather, it viewed the
refugees as living symbols of Arab Unity. This Unity was
loosely bound, by its pledge to restore Israel to i-.rab rule aM.
to repatriate all of the refugees. Govemm«mt imi^osition of
job restrictions on the refugees served to keep them in the
oaaps. The Egyptian military whioh wntrolled Gaza restrioted
refU^gee movements severely, evwi in the area. And, no one was
AO

p«KQitted to leave, except for pilgrimages to Macoa,^ Mijoy
of these restrictions were raaoved after the Isr eli occup^.ti<»i
in 1967.
Until March, 1958, the refugees in Gaza had no political
ri{^ts. Then, the Egyptian Government set up a system allowing
the Palestinians to eleot 23 of 30 mwbers of a new Legislative
Council. However, all Council actions were subject to the
approval of the Egyptian Government. Om of the Council's
first motions was to call for Gassa's membership in the UAE*
This action <m April 4» 1958, was never approved.
Under Egyptian administration, the Gaza 3trip was no mrd
"Uian a vast refugee camp. The area, 2$ miles long and five
miles wide, contained approximately 238,(XX)refugees and 102,000
natives. Almost no possibilities for employment existed.^ i^hren
'^^"Developments of the quarter," p, 164.
^A, G. Meserik, ed., Arab Hej^gees jjn the Middle Bwt.(New York,
International Review uervioe, 195^)» p. 15#
^&bld.
^bid.

-108the îm hundred, refugees in Egypt proper had no politloal rl^te.
However, this latter group did have access to courts of law
45
and these refugees were allowed to work and to travel freely.

SQrptian offloials have taken the attitude of not wanting
the refugees, v/hm the situation follov?ing the 1948 ./ar stabil
ized, most of the refugees were concentrated in the Gaza atrip*
Those remaining in Egypt iacoper have never received aid frma.
UHBWA* As funds ran out, the iigyptian Government, rather -tiian
supplying aid to the refugees, requested international aid.^
Egyptian representatives at the U. B., like other Arab delegates,
have criticized the Resolutions because they do not contain
guarantees that there would be no fUrthw cmrtailaent of services,
Divided amoz% themmelves, the refugees also act as a divi
sive factor on the Arab Governments. The Arab League has, on
more than one occasiw, considm^ed the formation of a ialestiniam
State. The main stumbling block, other than -&e refugees, is
the lack of Arab agreement on where and when and how. isgyptian
officials favor such a scheme. Jordan, on whose territory such
a State would most likely be created, naturally opposes it.
For a short time in the I960's Gaza was the seat of a x'ale&tine
Government in exile. Economic advancement in the area, brou^t
about by the United Nations iàmrgency Force and renewed citrus
production, plus lack of Egyptian support for the idea, helped
"^^Ibld.. p. 14.
^GAOR. 10th session. Special fieport of the Director Concerning
Other Claimants for Relief (A/297ô/Add. 1), aupplement Kixraber 15A, p. 6,
^'^GAOH. 12th liession, 728th Plenary Meeting (December 12, 1957)#
p. 57C
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to undermine the movecmit. It was shattered completely by the
June War,'^
In the late 1950's and early I960's, Egyptian Government
officials had begun setting up, supporting and encouraging
fedayeaa omvements, The increasing fedsyeen att&oks, despite
repeated U, H. efforts to curtail such activities since 1956,
show Egyptian determination to i^rsue aggression against Israel,
althou#! indirectly. As a result of both jiast and /est supply
ing arcis to the protagonists, border incidents have imltiplied
since 1956*

Many -Egyptian officers have pressed Hasser to reply

to Israeli atta<dcs more strenuously. However, he h.e resisted
as he is aware that the Egyptian Anay is no match for Israeli
military in face to face combat. He continues to let the
fedayeen groups cany out the guerilla attacrics and has assisted
in training the refugees for this type of warfare,
also recrui

There are

centers in agypt as in most other iirab countries•

The PLO also broadcasts daily from -.gypt over its ovm radio
stwiicn, the "ïoica of the utorm,"^^
As a result, the i^igyptians have had to defend against
increasing numbers of Israeli attacks along the Suez Canal.
The Canal area has been the main point of commando infiltration
from ilgypt.
The dis<aission in the early I96O'u of setting up an indepen
dent Palestine iiiEsy either under joint all—i^rab oommund or within
de St. Aubin, "Peace and Refugees in the Middle East,"
The Middle East Journal. Volume 3 (July, 1949)» P. 253#
^^Khouri, The Arab—Israeli Dilenma, p. 203.
^^ubenstein, OP. oit», p. 26.

-diathe framswork of the existing separate armies has brou^t no
im>re agreement*

EalAer, Jordanian representatives have threatmied

to walk out of Arab League cmetings if such a proposal wœre

51 This idea, ono© promoted by

even put on the Agenda.

iigypt, has fallen into disrepute sinoe I967 as the Arab states
are now trying to control and (mrtail the (xmoandos rather tiian
promte more violence by them.
The oooaaando threat has grown swiftly sinw the 1967 War
and seems to worry the Arab hosts more than the Israelis now.
Hussein in Jordan is finding the Palestinians more and more of
a liability as he hears Radio Cairo oaU tar his own assassina
tion. :]gyptian officials too have come to fear commando beXligmrenoe as it has beoome awkward and dangerous for tham, regiœ»ally and int&rnationally. Yet, th^ are at a loss cm how to

52 lîasser is no longer able to denounce the ccmnandos
CMitrol it.^
or to withhold funds without giving Cairo's enemies the ohanoe
to denounce the UAB as lacking the zeal for a holy mx and to
accuse Cairo of aiding Israel.'^"'
Lebanon and the Befugees
Lebanon, though having fewer refugees than dgypt or
^^J, 3. Raleigh, "The Middle East in 1960—^ folitical
Survey," Mddle Eastern Affairs, Volume 12 (February, I96I),
P. 45.
52
Huizinga, op. oit., p. 33.
5^Ibid.

—Ill—
Jordan, hsbs problems equal to or greater than those of her
neighbors* The political slaruoture of Lebanon is set up on
a symbiotic relation between Christians and Moslems* By offi
cial estimates the Christians compose approximately 5^ of the
population. However, there has been no accurate census in
years. The Government and proportional representation of #^e
country are struetared on the basis of this Christian nmjority*
To accept the Palestinians, 9C^ of whom are Moslems, would
upset this balance.Thus, the Palestinians in Lebanon have
never been given any political ri^ts. They are not granted
residence visas and must hold special identity cards or be
deported*

except in very rare cases, refugees who leave Lebanon

have not been granted return visas*

These rules apply to all,

but until 1958, they were ru>t enforced in the case of the
55
refugees supported by UM»/A»
The Lebanese have become even
HKsre antagonistic toward these refugees and now, the fhalange
Party of Public works Minister rierre G^aayel would like to
56
expel the refugees from Lebajtwn by force if it could*
As the Constitution stipulates that the ^resident be elected
from the lar^st religious sector, now the Christi^ms, most
Lebanese oppose ? ®8et tllng the refugees at all as they fear the
20th Session, Special Political Committee, 442nd
Meeting (October 29, 1965)» P* 1#
^^ezerik, op* cit*. p* I3.
^The Christian Science Monitor. March 31» 1970, p. 4.
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ialestinians would demand a new census wMch would result in a
57
Moal^ majority, thus upsetting the present balance.
The refugees hare, however, been better treated in the
abstract, as the embodiment of an idea, than they have as a
reality. The Lebanese people extend vocal support to the
1 alestin!an cause, but they are not enthusiastic about the
Palestinians acting on their omi.

At the outset of the May,

1958» crisis in Lebanon, the pro-West Government against whom
the insurrection was conducted, warned that the penalty for
refugee participation would be severe. The refugees under UîîEï/A
care did not actively participate, althou^ for the most part
they were followers of the Arab nationalist policies of Haseer
59
and aympatbized with the goals of the insurgents.*^'
Though there have been few self—support projects in Lebanon
becasue of the lack of governmental approval, the Lebanese do
expend 20^ of their national budget on the refugees. They also
provide a monthly grant of 10 kilos of flour or bread and three
Lebanese pounds per month per refugee.Too, since I965, a
number of Lebanese refugees have been able to find employment,
especially around Beirut and Tripoli.
^^./olf, OP. cit.. p. 356.
^Irene L. Gendzier, "Lebancm and the Palestinians," New
Outlook. February, I969, P. 23.
^^Meaerik, op. cit.. p. 13.
Aubin, op. oit», p. 253.
^^6A0B. 11th Session, Annual Report of the Director of the
United Hâtions Belief and Vorks Agmicy for ralestine Refugee# in
the Near East (A/3212), Supplement Number I4, p. 6,

-1135iKLoe the 19^7 War, Lebanese government crises oaused by
the ^erillas hare been frequent. ^Palestinians have been ezerqis—

62

ing effective political control in some fifteen refugee camps*

In October, ipég, the situation worsened when the Anqy cracked
down on fedayeen for operating in populated areas supposedly
barred to them by earlier agreements*^^ This followed jprofedaye^ demonstrations in April, 196), which precipitated a
government crisisThe main battle was in early November,
1969, over the town of Hashaya, a government held villain some
^,000 feet up the slopes of Mount Hermon near the oyrian border.
The oapWre of Bashaya would have nmant that the oossaandos
could have brou^t their supplies directly over Syrian roads
rather than by ivay of mountain trails which are impassable in
the winter. The capture would also have strengthened the comman65
dos position when and if they sat down to negotiate with Beirut.
However, the Lebanese army, half moslem and half Christian,
remained loyal to the Government. Seventeen men defended
Hashaya, holding off a fedayeen force of

killing five and

capturing five without a loss.^^
The most recent Lebanese guerilla crisis be^ua in larch, I97O»
Lebanese guerillas clashed vith government troops at at least one
•'Calling the Tune," Newsweek. November 10, 1969# p. 47*
^^Lebanonj

Along," p. 30»

^^GÂQB. 24th Session, Report of -Uie Coimissioner-General of
the United Sations Belief and /orks Agency for Palestine llefUgees
in the Near East (A/76I4), ^Supplement lumber I4, p. 1.
Calling the Tune," p. 47»
Lebanon*

Along," p, 35*
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control of fifteen refugee camps, have physioal control of some
adjoining residential areas of Beirut and Tripoli,
The guerillas have the support of Lebanon*© lower—income
groups, students and leftist intellectuals, Both the Pales
tinians and the opposing Phalange rarty members, mostly
Christian Lebanese, have arms. The Phalai^sts claim 200,000
supporters. Approximately 10,000 of these, they claim, are
armed. This group claims to be defending its "Lebanese way of
life" from encroachment of the foreign Palestinians. Though
they do not op^se the fi^t against Israel, they no longer
63
want it waged f^om Lebanese territory.
3o determined are
many Lebanese in this belief that they are willing to arm and
incur the risk of civil war to impress this feeling wi the
Palestinians.
Thou^ Lebanon has fewer refugees than Egypt or Jordan,
it is mwe vulnerable to them j^rtly because of the delicate
national political balance. Part of the Government's troubles
stem from the fact that the reAigees are given jobs in the
expanding economy, but are not accorded any leg^l or political
rights. The fact that the coimandos now operate many of the
Lebanese reftigee campe as CŒmando training centers has not
imj^roved. the situation. But, more of a problem as an instigator
^^The Christian Science Monitor. March 31, 1970, p. 4*
^®Ibid,
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The S.vrians and the Palestiniang
The Syrlaz# are the most militant of the host states and
the cmly state willing to risk an all-cRit #ar with Israel for
the Palestine cause»

Thpy have brou^t problmm to their neighm»

bw8 by their unconcealed entxRiragmmant aWL support of the
guerillas.

HOT has the Syrian Governs^t been one of the most cooper
ative with Agency projects. The Government did sign an agreeffi«mt with the Agency on October 13, 1952» in v^ich it expressed
a desire to ooopwate in the developmmit of rehabilitation
projects for about 85,OCX) registered refugees, and did
budget

milliim for the projects. Only two small projects

materialiiMd. These were on marginal lands and development was
69
accomplished at vary hi^ cost.' Though the projects were
advantagews for the Syrian Govmmment, they would never bring
about the resettlemmit of all of the refugees.
In the Director's report for I956, ha noted that even if
the refugees in Lebanon and Syria wwe to become selfnmpporting,
-tile greatest part of the problem would remain as four-fifths of
the refugees are located elsewhere. Aa in Lebanon, many of the
Syrian refugees have found full w part-time work, Hefugees
in agricultural areas in Syria have the same opportunities fw
^^GAQH. gth Session, Annual Report of the Director of the
United Nations Belief and works Agenqjr for Palestine Refugees
in the Kear Sast (A/2717), Supplenmnt Number 17» p. 12.
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and mnnv in the industriel centers,

(>s-^i3cic.ll;.' .llano aaid
The

iir.e th -

Slip ort for til-' rufu-ecs.

• find full—tirao jmployr:<;nt«70
tians, arc ooncorned, about

.'joncy

-hoy have, abstained on resolutions

which did not contain ^'ul'ficiont marantees against a reduction
in if-ency se;rvicas.

Yot, in 195'7» n:-r;:^tiatioii3 viora underyraj

for the; transfer of the itanandon agricultural sottlonont to the
•Syrian Coverntaont. I'h-j sattl.j::.vnt housed 374 refu ou -foxdlies
and ooou,.iad 1,496 dunuas of land. -l'hua, the -yrirn Government
benefitted fi-ora another .rojeot to .Aioh it had contributed little.
inoe 196I, ralationchi ;b betwo an Israel and .^Tia have

been

noro strainsd than Israeli relations with othor ^rab -tatys,
military incidents batween bhese t?/o hrv
In October, I967, the ..^'rian ^ rino

also been :;ore serious.

inistar stated that " e ara

not sentinels over Israeli security and are not the

jash that

restrains th.. revolu'&ion oT Ui3 displaced and jursecutod
tinijui i.eo:;le,"

The

ales—

72 This corroent invlied to the Icraelis and to

the ..raias that -yrian officials woula do little to curtail
coîîïïTîando activities

in the area. It also implied that the

uyrian Goveriment would not agree to any ^-oace settlement op
posed by the

aal^stinians.

70
CTvia, 11th session, .nnual le.ort of tho director of the
United Nations ..elief and orks agency for aalestins Refugee# in
the Hear ,ast ( /3212), vU^, element a umber l.I, p, 6,

71

12th . eesion, .uinual Report of the Jireotor of the
baited j.atiijus ..eliuf ;.nd orlai ..^enoy for .aleatine .Lwitigoea in
the Kear .,ast (../3696), Supplement iiuraear I4, p. 26,
72
•Jharles ... Yost, "Tha jerab—Israeli ..ar: ilow It Jegan,"
aorei,:-n .affairs. Volume ..:|6 (Jcinuary, ly68), p, 305.
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enjoyed the same civil ri^ts ae Syrian citizens. They are
allowed to work, to leave the country and to return, The
Government has granted 60 piasters per day to registered
refugees over ten years of age and 40 per day to those under
tan. Local assistance and medical services have, when possible,
73
been provided without charge.
According to U. N. technical
surve]^ before 196O, all of the foara^r Palestinians oould
be absorbed in Syria. The cultivable area is over I4 million
acres#

Only six million are used at present.

Syria is the only <me of the major host countries in whiWi
the refugees have failed to create almost insurmountable social
and economic problems. There are two reasœus for this—the
Syrian willingness to back the oomiando groups rather than
trying to ourtail their activiMes and the fact that the oommando activities may be planned cm Syrian territory, but are
staged elsewhere.
By the middle of August, 1^6, reports indicated that
both Lebanim and Jordan wwe trying to curtail Fatah activities
and ixrevent Fatah from using their territories a» bases of
operation. The commandos began more and move using Syrian
territory i^ioh brou^t about increasin^y difficult IsraeliSyrian delations, During the few years before the 1^7 k)'ar,
^%t. Aubin, OP. cit.. p. 253»
^^ereta, Israel and the Palestine Arabs, p. 24,

-118Palostinian extramiat elements located mainly in iyria advo
cated the overthrow of Xing Hussein of Jordan on the groimds
that he \ms a pmm of the .Vest and too soft on Israel, 3y
late 1966, reports indicated that several liXah Governments felt
insecure, largely because of oomnando actions and words in
Syria,

All were jjov/erless to taico measures against this

group which v/as encouraged by the Liyrians. The situation
worsened when a new, mora radical Government took power in I966.
It supported the claims of the Palestine Liberation iiTciy which
mobilised and inflacmd the refugees and carried out many of the
raids oa Israel.
The Syrians, by late I967» wre denying the responsibility
for the existence or operation of the Palestinian activists#
UowevOT, the Syrians have done mare in the way of providing
supplies, training and encouraging these groups than any other
major host country, including ^igypt, in recent years* Syrian
officials have denied any complicity even when Israeli repre77
sentativas have lodged complaints in the Security Council»
Their statements are still not so strong as those of the other
Arab States which began denying involvaaent in oonmando activi
ties several years ueforu, and are now trying to devise means
to control the commandos. Syria still remains the most receptive
^^Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilenma. p. 306.
^^ost, OP. cit.. p. 305,
"^'jihotiri. The Arab-Israeli Diletaaa. p. 233.
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the corraaaado organizations politioally.
Summary
The Arab Goverimants have be^ antagonistic toward the
refugees since shortly after they emigratW. from Palestine*
Although the Goverxa&ents and the people sympathise with the
refugee ideal of a return to Palestine, neither officially nor
unofficially have the host governments weloomed the refugees*
Only in Jordan have they been granted citizenship»

They are

not equal to other citizens there or in any host country* The
United Hâtions has retained the responsibility for the refugees
in camps, or for about 4C^ of the populati<m. Ctaly about
of the refugee population has really reestablished itself in
the Arab world* The remainder of the Palestinians are still
a very definite fringe group* Part of this status stmrn from
the fact that the Palestinians themselves do not want to be
integrated and thereby give up their legal olala to either
repatriation or compensation*
Partly because of this refugee rejection and partly because
of the host governments and populations* antagonima to the
refugees, little ooncrete has taken place in the way of resettle
ment* The host states still consider the State of Israel as an
outsider in the Middle East* They have used the refugee problem
to maintain a semblanoe of Arab Unity as well as to carry out
their personal hatreds for Israel in an indirect manner*
By prolonging the refugee situation, they have created a

-120problem isbioh they now find damaging to theaiselves unci so far
insoluble»

The refugsea hava become armed, .dth the aid of

the iirab States, and have become militant, both toward Israel

and toward the ilrab States wbdoh still refuse to grant them
political equality*

The Palestinians have since I967 broadened

their fi^t against colonialism in Israel to a fi^t against
the colonialist /irab Governments. Today, more than ever before,
the ilrab States, with the possible exception of Syria, would
like to find a solution to the refugee problem before they
themselves are eradicated. However, because of the rising power
of the Palestinians, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
begin a governmental compromise. The Arab Governments are
finding that now they must concentrate more on preserving their
own existence than on trying to come to an agreement with Israel.

It has also becoî;;e doubtful whether the lirab Governments and the
Israeli Government could achieve a solution even if they agreed
to one on paper. For, the Palestinians, and their militant
ooiïEiando organizations, have taken the position that there will
be no solution without Palestinian participation.
Though the Palestinians now seem to be beyond the control of
the Arab States, most of the hosts are concerned with the inter
nal and regional consequences being brought on by the commandos
and are looking for ways both the solve the situation permanently
and to placate their T'aiestinian populations in the meantime,
'fhe Syrian Government is backing the Palestinians and presently
shoira little worry for the oountry's internal security or its

-121relationships with the other host governments.
The refugees' belief that time would not solve the problem
is becoming moTe certain. Rather time seeaa to h'ava hardened
Palestinian determination to regain the homeland in Palestine.
The refugees' actions have proved a detriment to many of the
Arab States and to relationships betv/een the various countries
in the area. Tet, they also have started the Governments
oonoerned to consider more seriously than ever before the
possibilities open for a final solution to the problems.

GHàJPTii.i fil
COHCIUSIOHS
The Palestine conflict wsm initially a conflict between
govemnmnts in the area. The Arab Governments had (me set of
prereqnisitea for a solution} the Jews another. The ixab
officials took idie more legal of the two positions, basing their
stands on United Nations resolutions, azui particularly on the
solution outlined in Resolution 194(111)• They also felt that
any solution should be of the total problem and not on an
issue-by-isse basis. Hor would they agree to direct talks
with the Israeli Government's representatives. The Israeli
Government refused to take back the refugees because of secur
ity reasons as well as the influx of J&m it had absorbed both
from around the world and frtm the neighboring Arab States.
iiather, Israeli officials, prior to 196?, preferred the reset
tlement of the refugees in the iirab States. They also felt that
the only means to & solution was direot talks between the
governments involved on an issue by issue basis.
During this time of Arab—Israeli ^vernamntal deadlock
on a diplomatic level, the refugees were ezisting in the host
countries in refugee camps set up by the United Nations. Thou#i
fairly docile politically in the earlier years of the conflict,
they were even then making their feelings known by their reactions
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major

resettloîaent programs as these would prejudice their right to
repatriation or oompansation. They preferred to keep the
oonfliot alive by their presence as refugees rather than begin
ning life anew in the ^trab States where they did not feel welcoao. By using educational facilities provided by UHH.vA, with
the aim of preparing them for resettlement, they kept alive
and nurtured a Palestinian culture.
Gradually this Jralestinian culture bacai.ie stronger, ^rior
to the June iiax and with the encouragement of thw iirab states,
the xalestinianQ began forming militant, political groups whose
aim was to liberate r'alestine* These groups have kept up a
steady war of attrition on Israel from outside of the State's
borders. However, their hopes of beginning coamando activities
from within Israel proper and from within the occupied areas
have largely failed.
Israeli officials, particularly after the 196? </ar, have
taken measures to quell such activities among the /irabs in
Israel, economic ties have been maintained between Israel and
the neighboring Arab states. The military has also tried to
maintain the governments in the occupied areas on the f<mner
basis as much as possible. The expanding Israeli econoz^y Is
another incentive to the refugees to tolerate Israeli rule.
However, Israeli officials have taken no concrete, long-range
steps to find a solution to the conflict or to provide the
refugo'ïs with a status other than their taaporary, ftnistrating

CŒie

of refugees#

Also,

whan any of the Israeli Arab ijopulation

has attempted sabotage or even aided the conmando groups,
retaliation has been swift and severe.
The Arab States, thou^ moro kinsmen of the Palestinians
than the Jews, have encountered ever increasing probleE® with
the refugees. Only Jordan, among the roajor host states has
granted the refugees citizenship. In the other states refugees*
movœients are restrictedj they are not citizens, and many are
not allowed to work, The Arabs are now having their own prob
lems vyitL the refugees, and with the consaando groups which
they instigated. The consnandos are demanding equality with the
Arab Govemments and are demanding they be allowed to operate
from Arab territory to launch their military forays against
Israel, The jirab States do not seem able to curtail this
activity as the Pelestinians are better armed than the hosts,
Palestinian raids on Israel also bring retaliatory raids on the
host countries, not just on the Palestinians, Thus, they are
becoming more a military than social problem to their ;lrab hosts.
The Ialestinians, like the Israelis, do not favor and claim
they will not accept a solution which is imposed on them. At
this time, several of the „rab States seemingly would like to
have a solution imposed just to rid themselves of the problems
they have with the refugees. The Israelis and the Palestinians
both feel that the problem is two-sided. However, the sides
they choose are different. The Palestinians maintain that the
problem is between themselves and the iitate of Israel, Israeli

officiels fjiil that tà«- ^roblec should be solved by tlu regional
govsrnrnents, Yst, the Palestinians, who currently aoeE to be
blocking a settlaaant, do not appear at all vvilling to oomj^omise#
And to arrive at any solution, compromise would bo neoessara'
between the ooaiaandos, tho /urab Govornnonts and the Israeli
Government*
^s^eoially in the ^ast ten years, the ral^tiniane have
been nxjre uf a liability than an asset in finding a solution
to the kiddle aastern conflict, ^ilthough oc..asîùndo influence on
Israel and the host countries did affeot the ^jcab states and
Israel* s decisions to try to agree to some solution based on
the 19o7 security Council Resolution, any agreement is still
negligible. Too, although UI©.»Â and other organisations have
expended a great deal of money in the area, little has been
achieved except tlie continued existence of the refugee popu
lations, The refugees have not helped to end the drudgery of
life in the camps nor have they contributed to the development
of the xirab Lliddle Jast. By remaining refugees they have
prolonged the Palestine conflict and have rejuvenated a Pales
tinian culture and political entity.
In Israel, the ^tate they are out to destroy, they have
probably been the least officious, although their nuisance value
has been more than minimal. They have consistently rejected
solutions proposed by the Arabs, by Israel and by the United
Hâtions. Yet, they have developed no conorete set of plans or
programs of their own. The entire case of the Palestinians seems

to rust yn a nagbtlvu idoa—the.

vruotion of the ^i^te of

Israel as it now exists, j^jond. this thv various .u.lestiuian
groups are unat.1© to agroe on -hat form another _alwstiniaa
state should take and .vhethor it would or would %ot iaolude
the present Jewish population of the area. That both the
.--lostinians and Israel have stated thqy .ifould be agreeable to
Ù. state comprised of both ^rabs and Jews, if the other g^roup
were willi.;;s to live peacefully, has proved to be no opening for
a .^.lestinian-Iaraeli settluraunt. .^ach is envisioning a state
in whioh it is dominant, not a state where .arau and Jew are
eq.ual. Thus, the current problem would just be continued,
poscibly in closer proximity.
i'o confuse the situation even aore, the ^ alestinians
refuse to aooe^t an imposed solution and are so j.-reoooupied
with their military endeavors that they have little time to
sit down and participate in any concrete discussions ahich i&ight
result in partial or total solution. The ralestinians also
claim that any solution should ue between themselves aad the
Israelis, The Israelis want a governmental solution. The
jvrabs, in a weak position and being pressui'ed by botli the
Israelis and the Palestinians, seem more and more willing to
try to find an agreeable solution /hich can be achieved honor
ably.
On the iidlitary level, the .alestinians originally vdith
backing from some of the ;irab Jtates have drastically escalated
the conflict, .ere it not for the guerilla attacks since the

1967

the I iddxe .est

-vould h:.v . virtually boon . t _.eaca.

By being so militaristic, the . alastinians have caused the Arab
host states to increase their

OV.TI

arnies ;»nd volice forces

both the maintain order Internally fmd to defend thoraelvas
against the grovfing number of Israeli reprisals. This grovving
number of reprisals can be directly attributed to the increasing
number of attacks made on Israel by the ralostinians.
By thzlr militance, the . alestinifins sosm to have j^^ainod
few allies, oithor regionally or internationally, at least for
their rneans, I^any still do sympathize with their flight and
with their overall objective to regain Palestine, at least in
the 'Iddlo

Bast. However, by transforming the conflict from

a diplomatic stalemate into a military standoff at best, the
commandos have gotten publicity, but little additional support,
Esther the Arab hosts are now expending more energy in trying
to control the :alestinians-—the'Scune groups they were instru
mental in cr9ating--than they are in devoting time to a solution.
The Palestinians have been one cause of a worsening of relations
between the Arab host governments as well as between the Arab
and Israeli Governments. Their actions have also showi the
Israeli and Arab Govcrmn nta the necessity of settling the con
flict as soon as possible. Yet, because of j ileatinian influ
ence and disruptions in the Arab States, none of these Govern
ments has felt secure enou^ to attempt a oompromiae settlement.
In addition to military reourcuasions, the worsening military
situation has also had economic and social conseq.uenoes for the

area. By forcinft tho = r&b States s-nd Israel to place so much
money, time and emphasis on the military, the i-alestinians have
contributed to a slovd-ng of the development of the entire area#
They have certainly not helped agricultural or industrial
development by refusing to allow major United Hâtions irriga
tion projects such as the Yarmuk—Jordan 7alley progi'aci. Other
effects, however, have been r.ore indirect, tut not any less
damaging.
By turning UîHîM camps into guerilla tr aining areas, the
groups have earned the wrath of ever—growing segments of i&e
international community. Indignation at this technique has
roant that some of the refugees foinerly eligible for relief
no longer are. These refugees must be supported by the host
states in //hich they are residing or must fend for themselves,
l.ither method has placed the burden of their support on the
host states. This has meant an Increasing diversion of monies
v.'hich nl(yb.t other?d.se have been available for development of the
area, National development would croate jobs, some of which
might be secured for the refugees. However, to many of the
refugees, giving up camp life for permanent employment still
indicates acceptance of a de facto resettlement which they
oppPSe,

•iooially the refugees have refused to integrate themselves
with the host populations; nor have the host countries really
wanted ùhem. Those refugees living in Israel have had little
opportunity to become integrated with the Jewish population,
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parts in the Arab State». The refugees, rather, sema to
prefer life in the aeourity of the refugee camps to that in
a strange world where they must struggle to ezist* Their schools
in particular have remained oriented toward the past Palestin
ian culture. Socialization, throu^ education, has deliberately
brou^t about a more conscious feeling of being Palestinian
tinan Arab.
Though the Israelis hare consistently maintained that the
host countries should resettle the refugees because of dose
religious, social and cultural ties, the Palestinians maintain
that these ties do not exist, at least to the extent thou^t by
the Israelis. The feeling of being Palestinians, together with
the discrimination encountered in the host states, has done
little to gensM^te a feeling of Arab brotherhood, àren in
Israel, which semis to have tees&p problems with the Palestinians
than the Arab Govermmnts, the Palestinians are definitely not
equal to tiie JmdLsh population.
The social and eooncHoio problems oatmed by the refugees have
bew sxare a function of their political feelings and military
actions than they have of pre-planned courses of action. Parti
cularly in their relations with Jordan and Lebanon have the
refugees brought near chaos to internal politics. The delicate
baleaoe on which the Government of Lebanon rests could be (wmpletely torn apart by the refugees. That in Jordan has been
brou^t to the brink of destruction on several occasions, with

-130the refugee#, as cdtissens in Jordan, waging muoh influence on the
country»

The fact that Syria and !:;gypt have encouraged the

Palestinian forays against Israel while Lebanon and Jordan hare
been cool toward this activity has not bolstered the almost
fictitious Arab unity. The two states which have opposed
reAigee military activities have had to bear the brunt of
military and political repureussions both internally aM.
externally Arom Israel as it is these two territories tvom
r/hioh the major share of the attacks are launched. Bo^ Jordan

and ^gypt have been prime losers of territory, especially after
the June War. Each state seem to view the Palestinian problaa frcm its own perspective rather than working together to
achieve an overall settlement.
Yet, the hosts* treatmmat of the refugees seems to have had
little affect on the refugees reactions to the hosts. Though
the refugees are citizens in Jordan, they have caused cm mudi
if not more trouble there ^an they have in ^gypt and Leban(m
where they are not accorded citiaenship or status. Their reactions
to the hosts seem to be based on criteria other than how they
are treated. The Palestinians, in fighting to destroy a
colonialist situation in Israel, have seen a similar situation
in Jordan and Lebanon and seem equally deteimined to eradicate
Arab colonialism. Thus, though the Arab States would like to
see the elimination of Israel as a neighbor, they are coming to
feel safer having Israel on their borders than having the
refugees in their own wuntries. Qaly Syria, so far, does not
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seem particularly incoitvenienoed by the reAigees. The Govern
ment has been willing to support their cause and mioourages
their militemoe. Yet, few of their military aotivities actually
take place fr<m Syrian territory.
The participation ^f the Palestinians in Arab League meetings
has proved, another disruptive influence. The Palestine problem
is, of course, on the agenda. The conference is disrupted by
Arab infighting tm this topic. Though the Arabs have now
included the Palestinians in regional activities, the Pales
tinians have fOTsmd tkeir own regional organisation which
excludes the Arab ^^amments. The Palestiniai^ want to be
included in iirab affairs, yet they also want to maintain their
independence fr<m #e Arab Governments. This sentiment has
created a situation idxich the Arab Governments are now finding
difficult to ju8tif)y. For a people without a developed inf^astxucture and wl#out a territory of their own from which to
operate, the Palestinians are politically powerful to an uncom
mon degree. Just by threats against Israel, the Palestinians
are coming to wield more and more political influence* That
the host govemmmiW are not militarily or politically able to
curtail them has caused m&ny additional problems. Thus, while
the Palestinians have grown stronger, the host governments have
gradually realized that they have created more problems for
themselves than they had wMLa simply fighting Israel*
However, the refugees powerful position in the Middle Bast
may not be so stable as they would like to think, Thou^ the
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Governments are b0<XNaing increasingly vmry of the power ooaoentrated in the refugees* hands. Seemingly they will try to
control or decrease this power as soon as they can determine
how* It would still s^^era that if the Arabs end the Israelis
ware to agree to a solution, the refugees oould be forced to abide
by it# For the Israelis, as evidenced by their continuing war
with the commandos and the Arab States, do have the military
power neoeewmary to Impose a solution, if it were to be imposed
only on the reftjgees.
It irould appear, however, Ijkat a solution imposed from
outside would be docmed to failure. The refugees and the
Israelis are bol^ against such a solution. The refugees and
the Arab Governments blame the present problem on the United
Hâtions and "foreign intervention" and so would not be likely
to ask those who perpetrated -&e present problem to solve it.
The refugees are fitting against larael and oolonialiem and
an outside imposed solution wcnild seemingly be just another
form of oolonialiam*
A regional solution because of the Palestinians a&em oloser
t an ever before. Yet, several major obstacles still need to
be overcome before there would even be serious peace discussion.
Palestinian insistence on the implementation of Besolution 194(111)
is both impractical and in^ossible, as the Arab Governments have
come to realize. On this stand, the Palestinians have few
allies. Hather, the Israelis and most of the ilrab Governments
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Security Council Résolution. Yet, little has been done to
explore its possibilities for a settlement, largely because of
the stand of the Palestinians against it. For the Palestinians,
fearing an jlrab—Israel i solution, have kept Arab intmrnal
politic» unstable as well as continuing their military actions
against Israel. This haa left little time for either direct
or indirect governmental ne^tiations.
The Palestinians unwillingness to compromise should come
as no surprise. Their rejection for twenty years by Israel and
by the Arab States has caused them to d^mnd a separate state,
preferabley a state at the expense of Israel. This feeling of
rejection, watoined with a growing Palestinian nationalism,
has provided further complications to the problem.
However, because of the lack of agreement on comiando
means and goals as well as the lack of militance on the part
of the Israeli Arabs, it would seem probable that the Pales
tinians could agree to a settlement, if given their own state.
Many of the Palestinians are noiwailitant sympathizers with the
coœando cause, but seem more anxious to rebuild a stable, per
sonal life than to destroy Israel. A Palestinian state would
not necessarily mean the destruction of Israel, but certainly
some Israeli territory would have to be contributed. If the
Palestinian and Israeli Giuiem that they were willing to live
in peace are more than propagandizing, such a state mi^t placate
the majority of the refugees, thou^ doubtfully all of thsa. Such

-134action mi^t reduce i aleatinlan influence to moT& moderate
proportione»
Althou^ the ialestinians have caïused the i^abs and the
Israelis to think seriously about a solution to the iale#tine
problem and to the r@^ngw proi^lea, they have also created a
ollmate which i» not conducive to making peace. They have
forced the laraelia and the ^irabs to think first of their omi
defense and preservation end to think secondarily of peace*
Until recently# the Arab hosts have not really desired to
curtail the refuses# For all have favored the same causethat of restoring Palestine to Arab rule, Bow that the Arab
Governments are being threatened politically and militarily
by the Palestinians, they find themselves unable to curtail
refugee activities*
whether an Arab-Israeli settlement would ever placate the
Palestinians is difficult to guess. However, it would aotm that
with th@ commando movement possibly losing some of its original
attraction and with a partial refugee acceptance of Israel, at
least on the part of those living in Israel and the occupied
ax&aSf that the refugees too might be willing to accept a
settlement short of the 1948 Résoluticm, or short of the
eradication of Israel. However, they, like the Arabs end the
Isratelis, have taken suoh a dogoatic political position that
it seems especially difficult for them to reverse it, even
gradually.
Since it has not been possible to settle the issue among the

-135regional governments 8lno% 194B, it soeuia ao mora likely that
by adding another faotor—the refugees—to the oontooversy that
a solution will be achieved any more readily. Althou^ the
rafugees have brought about a desire for peao@, jpartioularly
on the part of the ^Irt a Govarnnenis, they have helped to
provide neither the means nor the conditions necessary to
concentrate on a peace aettlmmit. Kor does it eeais that the
refugees will be instrummital in bringing about a peaceful set
tlement of the conflict, solely on their om. terms, in the
near future.
The curreait problem still seems to be one between the
Middle &ast Govemments. Yet, the situation is more com%)lex
than twenty years ago. The Governments still mist a^jree to
a compromise solution, 3ut, if and when they do agree, and
the situation is rapdily beocaning one in s.hioh they , ould like
to agree, they are f&dnj a problem which did not exist twenty
years ago. Mow, in addition to agreeing on a solution, the
^irab and Israeli Governments rnxat devise the means to either
impose su(^ a solution on -Wie Palestinians or gain l-alastinian
acceptance of a solution.
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APPENDIX i)
UNIT&D KAÎIONB, GKHEBAL ASSBMBLY
ssiOLUTicai 194(111), DEcmma 11, 1948
FAMGHAPH 11
11# RESOLVES that the refugees wishing to return to their
htmes and live at peace with #ieir nei^bora should be p@Md.tted
to do so at the earliest ixraotioable date, and that oompftosaticm
should be paid for the progeria of those ohoosing not to return
and for loss of or damage to property laâiioh, ui^er principles
of international law or in equi^, should be made good by the
Governments or authorities responsible}
the Gonoili&ti(m G«mission to facilitate
the reimtriation, resettlement and eoonosio and social rehabiXi»
tation of the refugees and the payment of (xmpensation, and
to maintain olose relations with the Director of the United
Nations Belief fen? Palestine EeAigees and, throu^ him, with the
appropriate organs aM agencies of the United Hationsf • • • •

APFKSflIX E
UHITEi) liVTIOHS, SiiCUEITY GCXÎHCIL
RisomciŒ 242 (1967), movEmm 22, 1967
The 3eouxity Counoll,
Éxs'T&mniJûLg its o(mtizming oonoem with the grave situation
in the Middle East,
azgihaalzing the inadmissibility of the actuisition of
territoxy by war axsd the need to work for a just aM lasting
peaoe in which every State in the area oan live in sewrity,
âaphasizing flirter that all Member States in their acoeptanoA of the Charter of the United Bâtions have undertaken a
oœmitment to ajt in acoordance wii^ Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of #e Charter principles
requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the
Middle Bast which should include the application of both ^he
following principles*
(i) Withdrawal of Israel anmd forces from territories
owupled in reo^t conflict;
(ii) Tœndnation of all claim» or states of belligerency
and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty*
territorial integrity and political independence of
every State in the area and their ri^t to live in
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free
frcm threat or acte of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) for gumranteeing Areedam of navigation -Utrou^
international waterways in the area;
b) For a<Aievlng a just settlemmt of the refugee problem;
c) For guaranteeing the twritwial inviolability and
political independence of evwry State in the area,
thrwigh measures including the establishmmit of
demilitarized z<mes;
3« Bequests the Secretary-General to designate a Special
Representative to proceed to the lîiddle Bast to establii^ and
maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote
agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted
settlenœnt in aocwdance with the provisions and principles in

this resolution}
4# Bequests the Seoret&ry-Geaeral to report to the
Security Ommoil <m the progress of the efforts of the Speoial
BepresentatiTe as soon as possible.
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